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RACISM IN THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM: THE DEFENDANT'S USE
OF PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES*
J. ALEXANDER TANFORD**
I. INTRODUCTION
Howard Beach is a racially mixed, racially troubled section of
Queens, New York. In the fall of 1986, incidents of interracial violence
and harassment were on the increase.' Then, on December 20, Michael
Griffith's car broke down in that neighborhood. He and two friends
walked to a nearby restaurant to seek help. As they left the restaurant
they were attacked by a gang of white youths waving baseball bats and
shouting racial epithets. One of Griffith's friends was severely beaten.
Griffith was chased onto a busy freeway, where he died after being struck
by a car. The only apparent motive for the attack was that Griffith and
his friends were African-Americans. 2
Ten months later, Jon Lester, Scott Kern, and Jason Ladone were
brought to trial for the killing of Michael Griffith. Racial feelings and
emotions in the community were running high. As part of their defense
strategy, the white defendants began to use their peremptory challenges
to remove every African-American from the jury. On September 21,
after the first six jurors had been seated, presiding Justice Thomas A.
Demakos stopped the jury selection. He ruled that the defendants had
been exercising their peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory
* © 1989 J. Alexander Tanford. All Rights Reserved.
** Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University-Bloomington.
A.B. 1972, Princeton University; J.D. 1976, LL.M. 1979, Duke University. I am grateful to Lynne
Henderson for her helpful comments.
1. See Sobran, Howard Beach: The Use and Abuse of Race, NAT'L REV., Mar. 27, 1987, at
29.
2. See Johnson & McKillop, Howard Beach: An Angry Tide, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 12, 1987, at
25; Manslaughter, Not Murder, TIME, Jan. 4, 1988, at 38; Stengel, Black vs. White in Howard Beach,
TIME, Jan. 5, 1987, at 48.
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manner. Invoking the recent Supreme Court case of Batson v. Ken-
tucky,3 he stated that he would not allow any further race-based chal-
lenges. For the remainder of the jury selection the defense would be
required to state racially neutral reasons for excusing prospective jurors.
The first African-American was seated soon after the ruling.4
It is not immediately obvious whether Justice Demakos' ruling was
legally justifiable.' In Batson, the Supreme Court had invoked the equal
protection clause to forbid prosecutors from using peremptory challenges
in a racially discriminatory manner. The Court held that because the
prosecutor represents the state, and the state is prohibited from differen-
tiating among its citizens based on race, prosecutors could not use per-
emptory challenges to remove minority members of the venire solely on
account of their race.6 Because defense attorneys are not usually consid-
ered state actors, however, the Court explicitly reserved the issue of
whether they should likewise be restricted.7
This Article addresses the issue left open: Should defendants, like
those in the Howard Beach case, be allowed to engage in the racist use of
peremptory challenges when it is to their tactical advantage to do so?
This question is, in part, one of constitutional doctrine: Can Batson logi-
cally be extended to defendants, despite the apparent problem of lack of
state action? The question is also, however, one of normative values:
How should a court resolve the conflict between the defendant's individ-
ual interests and the community's need to be free from racial discrimina-
tion and violence? This normative issue is a deep one, ultimately
implicating the current debate between traditional liberal political philos-
ophy and modem communitarian theories of law.'
3. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
4. Howard Beach Jury Challenges Are Held Biased, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
5. The case is currently on appeal to the New York Court of Appeals after a lower court
affirmed the conviction. See People v. Kern, 149 A.D.2d 187, 222-34, 545 N.Y.S.2d 4, 26-33 (1989)
(affirming decision to apply Batson to defendants). Justice Demakos' ruling has been followed by at
least one other New York trial judge. See also People v. Muriale, 138 Misc. 2d 1056, 526 N.Y.S.2d
367 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (racial attack similar to Howard Beach incident in Coney Island).
6. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89, 96-97; see also Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 (1987)
(application of Batson principle to federal trials).
7. Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12. The Court stated that "[w]e express no views on whether the
Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel."
8. See Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L.
REV. 543, 544-50 (1986) (outlining the debate between liberalism and communitarianism); see also
Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-36 (1986); Rhode,
Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 594 (1985); Scales, The Emergence of
Feminist Jurisprudence: An Essay, 95 YALE L.J. 1373, 1376-80 (1986) (all describing various formu-
lations of communitarianism).
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This Article concludes that the needs of the community should pre-
vail over whatever tactical advantage an all-white jury might provide to
an individual defendant. Legal policy-makers should follow Justice
Demakos' lead and take steps to prohibit criminal defendants from exer-
cising peremptory challenges in a racist manner. Part II examines the
doctrinal issues underlying a defendant's racist use of peremptory chal-
lenges. It summarizes the argument against extending Batson to defend-
ants, critically analyzes the no-state-action claim, and argues that ample
support for a prohibition against race-based challenges can be found.
Part III examines the normative issues implicated in restricting a defend-
ant's tactical alternatives at trial. After restating the traditional claim of
the importance of paying special respect to the defendant's individual
trial rights, the Article argues that prohibitions against racist challenges
are nevertheless justified as long as all the norms of our trial system are
considered. The Article then suggests an alternative mode of normative
analysis based on contemporary communitarian legal theory that also
leads to the conclusion that Batson should be extended to defendants.
Part IV suggests that legal policy-makers-Congress, state legislatures,
and judges-have the power to curtail a defendant's racist use of peremp-
tory challenges and should exercise that power.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEFENDANTS' RACIST
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
I start with the premise that racial discrimination is morally wrong.
Generally speaking, therefore, steps taken by courts to eliminate racial
discrimination are desirable. Thus, the Supreme Court reached a correct
result in Batson v. Kentucky when it prohibited* state prosecutors from
exercising overtly racist peremptory challenges. Similarly, Justice
Demakos' decision in the Howard Beach case was a good one and should
be upheld unless some strong argument can be made to the contrary.
Of course, not all socially desirable regulations will survive constitu-
tional review. For example, stricter regulation of abortions, pornogra-
phy, private ownership of deadly weapons, or the contents of heavy
metal music might be deemed socially desirable yet still be interpreted as
unconstitutional by courts. The first inquiry, therefore, is whether con-
stitutional doctrine restricts courts from regulating race-based peremp-
tory challenges by defendants.
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A. THE ARGUMENT AGAINST EXTENDING BATSON
The first issue is what constitutional doctrine should be used to
review Justice Demakos' decision to limit the defendants' race-based per-
emptory challenges in the Howard Beach case. The most obvious candi-
date is equal protection, both because racial discrimination is involved
and because Batson was decided under that clause. This is the approach
taken by most commentators who have addressed the question so far.9
The analysis begins with the most similar case, Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 10 and asks if it was correctly or incorrectly decided under the
equal protection clause. The commentators agree that the result in Bat-
son was the right one.11 The prosecution was properly prohibited from
making race-based peremptory challenges because all four criteria for a
successful equal protection claim were satisfied: (1) the African-Ameri-
can defendant on trial was a person protected by the equal protection
clause; 2 (2) the defendant was a member of a racial minority with stand-
ing to object to the state's race-based challenges;' 3 (3) when prosecutors
exercise challenges, they engage in state action, 4 so judicial scrutiny is
justified; and (4) the state could demonstrate no compelling interest in
excluding minorities from jury service.' 5
9. Goldwasser, Limiting a Criminal Defendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry
and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808, 810-12 (1989); Note, Discrimination by
the Defense: Peremptory Challenges after Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 355, 358-65
(1988) (authored by E. Vaughn Dunnigan) [hereinafter Note, Discrimination]; Note, The Prosecu-
tor's Right to Object to a Defendant's Abuse of Peremptory Challenges, 93 DIcK. L. REv. 143, 144,
155-58 (1988) (authored by Michael Sullivan) [hereinafter Note, Prosecutor's Right]; Note, Defend-
ant's Discriminatory Use of the Peremptory Challenge after Batson v. Kentucky, 62 ST. JOHN'S L.
R v. 46, 52-57 (1987) (authored by John J. Hoeffner) [hereinafter Note, Defendant's Discriminatory
Use].
10. 476 U.S. 79 (1986); cf. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990) (holding that the sixth
amendment "fair cross-section" requirement does not extend to petit juries).
11. See, eg., Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 811. One might also argue that Batson should not be
extended to defendants because it was itself wrongly decided. Cf. Pizzi, Batson v. Kentucky: Curing
the Disease But Killing the Patient, 1987 Sup. Cr. REv. 97, 138-44 (arguing that the decision added
costs to trials and was therefore inefficient); Saltzburg & Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the
Clash Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REv. 337, 373 (1982) (written
before Batson, but arguing that no restrictions should be placed on peremptory challenges).
12. See Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 811 n.20.
13. The point is implicit; it is so obvious that the defendant had standing that none of the
commentators writes directly about it. See, e.g., Note, Discrimination, supra note 9, at 366-68 (dis-
cussing whether the prosecutor has standing).
14. E.g., Note, Prosecutor's Right, supra note 9, at 158.
15. See, e.g., Note, Discrimination, supra note 9, at 363 (arguing that while the state has a
compelling interest in providing an impartial jury, unfettered peremptory challenges are not nar-
rowly tailored to that end).
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The argument against extending Batson to defendants in order to
prevent them from making race-based peremptory challenges is that the
state and the defendant are not equivalent parties. If we substitute
defendant for prosecutor and prosecutor for defendant and then try to
satisfy the four criteria for a successful equal protection complaint, the
case fails. The argument goes as follows.
First, the state is not a person and therefore has no constitutional
rights. 6 Although the attorney prosecuting the case is a person in the
literal sense, the prosecutor "cannot properly be viewed as personally
involved in the trial,"' 7 but is an "aggregate" representing the commu-
nity and the sovereign. 8 While the sovereign may give constitutional
rights to others, it does not enjoy such fights itself.'9
Second, because the state is not a member of a cognizable group
entitled to protection, it lacks standing under a literal reading of Batson.
The Batson opinion clearly says that a complainant must be a member of
a "racial group capable of being singled out for differential treatment."20
Third, the defendant is not a state actor, but the state's opponent.
Therefore, a defendant's racially motivated peremptory challenges are
beyond scrutiny because "[p]rivate conduct, even if blatantly discrimina-
tory, cannot violate constitutionally guaranteed equal protection
rights."'" Defense peremptory challenges do not become state action
16. See Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 833 (claiming that no client or constitutional rights are
involved in the case of prosecutors).
17. Id. at 831.
18. Id. at 830-31.
19. Id. at 821-25.
20. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 94 (1986); see Pizzi, supra note 11, at 119 (claiming that
the quoted language poses a serious impediment to standing by the state and that the Court would
have to modify or abandon it if standing is to be found); cf. Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 811
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (language in Batson should not be interpreted as restricting stand-
ing; no obvious reason to premise standing on race of appellant).
21. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 812. In support of this assertion, Goldwasser cites the state-
ment in Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 227 (1965) (emphasis added), that "[t]he ordinary exercise
of challenges by defense counsel does not, of course, imply purposeful discrimination by state offi-
cials." The statement hardly seems relevant, because the racist use of peremptory challenges is not
"ordinary." Goldwasser also cites Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 318-19 (1981), in support
of her no-state-action argument. In that case, the Court held that a public defender was not an agent
of the state when representing a client. It is not clear what the Dodson case has to do with the state
action requirement, however, because it concerned a § 1983 action against the public defender for
asking to withdraw rather than file a frivolous appeal. But cf. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-
45 (1980) (state denied defendant his right to counsel and fair trial when privately retained defense
counsel did not provide adequate representation; state action found in "conduct of a criminal trial
itself").
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merely because they are state-created rights, 22 are exercised in a public
forum, 23 or entail minor judicial involvement. 24
Fourth, even if the first three objections are overcome, the defendant
may still be able to show that a right to the unfettered exercise of per-
emptory challenges survives strict scrutiny because it is narrowly tailored
to achieving a compelling governmental interest.25 For instance, requir-
ing that attorneys give reasons for challenging minority jurors might
frustrate the attorney-client privilege by forcing attorneys to disclose
confidential communications. 26  In addition, although peremptory chal-
lenges are not among the fundamental fights enumerated in the sixth
amendment,27 they might be characterized as necessary to presenting a
defense2' if their effective use made acquittal more likely.29 Similarly, if
22. Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use, supra note 9, at 53-55.
23. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 816. Goldwasser distinguishes Shelley v. Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1
(1948), on two grounds: (1) The restrictive covenants in Shelley were racist on their face, while
peremptory challenges are facially neutral; and (2) the Shelley court was being asked to impose
racial discrimination on others, while the Howard Beach judge is not requiring anyone to engage in
discrimination against their wishes. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 818-19. The distinctions are
merely semantic. As to the first, "covenants" and "peremptory challenges" are both facially neutral
until the parties put them to racist use. Comparing racial covenants with peremptory challenges is
therefore a comparison at different levels of specificity. As to the second, in both cases, as between
the parties appearing in court, one wished to discriminate and the other objected to it. The judges in
both cases were asked to override the wishes of one of the parties to the lawsuit who did not want to
perpetuate racial discrimination.
24. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 816-17; Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use, supra note 9, at
55-57.
25. See, eg., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970) (narrowly tailored); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-93 (1964) (strict scrutiny); see, eg., Note, Discrimination, supra note 9, at
358 (defendant may have a compelling interest in being allowed unfettered peremptory challenges).
26. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 831-33.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI gives defendants the right to the assistance of counsel, a speedy
and public trial, an impartial jury, confrontation of witnesses against them, and compulsory process
to obtain witnesses in their own behalf.
28. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 837 (claiming that defendant has a right "to put on a defense
free from state interference," though not specifically arguing that the right is a compelling interest).
29. The claim is frequently made that attorneys can win or lose their cases based on effective
use of peremptory challenges. See, eg., W. JORDAN, JURY SELECTION 2 (1980); A. MORRILL,
TRIAL DIPLOMACY I (2d ed. 1972); R. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A JURY 5 (1980). The
claim is bizarre. Attorneys cannot have a rational basis for making the claim, because they never
know what verdicts the excluded jurors would have returned. The only controlled experiment on
this question showed the claim to be dubious-some attorneys improved their juries and some made
them worse. Zeisel & Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and Verdict: An
Experiment in a Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 517-19 (1978). The experiment used
excused jurors as shadow juries, and the authors concluded that the "collective performance of the
attorneys is not impressive." Id. at 517. The authors projected that in only one out of twelve cases
would the jury's verdict actually have been affected by peremptory challenges, and that was only
because the prosecutor used his peremptories badly, not because the defense used them well.
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challenges for cause were often wrongly denied, peremptory challenges
might be considered necessary to achieving an impartial jury.30
B. THE ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF RESTRICTING RACIST
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES BY DEFENDANTS
1. Equal Protection
The assumption that equal protection is the most appropriate consti-
tutional doctrine for the legal analysis of a defendant's racist use of per-
emptory challenges has superficial appeal. After all, the situation
involves an issue of apparent racial discrimination. The problem is, how-
ever, that the way most commentators have framed the issue-whether
Batson can be applied literally to defendants-creates an unrealistic
hypothetical. Procedural barriers make it extremely unlikely that the
Supreme Court will ever have to rule on a prosecutor's challenge to a
defendant's racially motivated use of peremptory challenges.
In order for an issue to reach the Supreme Court, there has to be a
case or controversy. 1 Someone has to appeal from an adverse decision
in a lower court. In Batson, the defendant-appellant made and preserved
an objection at trial, 2 lost on that objection, was convicted, and there-
fore suffered harm because of the judge's decision to permit the state to
use racially motivated peremptory challenges. If we reverse the parties in
a hypothetical future case, however, a problem arises. If the state objects
to racist defense peremptory challenges, loses its objection, and then loses
the case, the double jeopardy clause prevents it from appealing. 33 There-
fore, a case exactly parallel to Batson could not arise.
For the issue to reach the appellate courts, the defendant would
have to initiate the appeal. That means that the defendant must have lost
the battle over peremptory challenges and been prevented from exercis-
ing race-based peremptory challenges. This is what happened in the
Howard Beach case. This scenario, however, puts the case in a very dif-
ferent posture from Batson. In Batson, the defendant-appellant could
make the easy argument that he was the victim of racial discrimination.
30. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
31. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2.
32. Failure to make an objection at trial and to preserve it for appeal results in a procedural
default, generally precluding the raising of the issue at the appellate level. See Wainwright v. Sykes,
433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977); Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1976); Tanford, An Introduc-
tion to Trial Law, 51 Mo. L. REV. 623, 702-06 (1986).
33. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. Nor would this issue appear to qualify for interlocutory appeal
under 18 U.S.C. § 3731, which allows the government to appeal the dismissal of an indictment, the
grant of a new trial, the grant of a suppression order, or the release of a defendant on bail.
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In the Howard Beach case, the defendant-appellants must make the less
palatable argument that they should have been allowed to engage in pri-
vate, racial discrimination. Can they find doctrinal support for this
claim?
It is difficult to imagine that the defendants could base their appeal
on the equal protection clause. They were not discriminated against on
account of race; rather, they were prevented from discriminating. The
defendants must therefore make the argument that some other constitu-
tional right has been infringed upon-presumably, the sixth amendment
right to conduct a defense. The Supreme Court would have no occasion
to engage in equal protection analysis except to offer an unnecessary
advisory opinion.
One commentator has suggested a possible way the equal protection
issue could get to the Supreme Court: if a trial judge allowed defendants
to exercise racist peremptory challenges, the prosecutor could be given
third-party standing to object on behalf of the excluded jurors." Yet this
approach would still not result in the equal protection issue reaching the
appellate courts. In order to satisfy the case or controversy requirement,
the prosecutor would still have to lose the objection and the trial, but
double jeopardy would prevent the prosecution from appealing an
acquittal. Similarly, there seems to be no way that an excluded juror
could personally appeal from a defendant's acquittal without also impli-
cating the double jeopardy clause.
The only feasible route by which an equal protection issue could
reach the Court would be if minority jurors brought a class action civil
suit claiming that defense attorneys were discriminating against them in
the exercise of peremptory challenges. If the practical problems of such
a lawsuit could be overcome,35 there is precedent for raising the issue this
way. In Carter v. Jury Commission3 6 the Supreme Court held that Afri-
can-Americans were entitled to bring a class action civil suit to complain
34. Note, Discrimination, supra note 9, at 366-67. See Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 812
(1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that defendants could be given third-party standing to
assert the constitutional rights of jurors).
35. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 558 (1979) ("Civil actions expensive to maintain and
lengthy, have not often been used" to remedy discriminatory jury selection practices.).
36. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
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of race discrimination if they were excluded from jury service.37 More-
over, the argument also could be made that appropriate community rep-
resentatives may bring such a suit, because racist jury selection injures
"the community at large." 38
However, even assuming that the procedural problems could be
overcome and that the matter arose in a context where the courts applied
equal protection methodology to the defendant's conduct, the argument
against extending Batson to prohibit racially-motivated peremptory chal-
lenges is nevertheless problematic. Doctrinal analysis of the scope of the
equal protection clause, its standing and state-action requirements, and
the compelling state interest test, all suggest that it is more appropriate to
restrict racist conduct by defendants than allow it.
a. The scope of the equal protection clause: The first issue is
whether a state prosecutor may assert a right to equal protection at all.
While it is technically true that the state is not a "person" and therefore
has no constitutional rights, in practice this statement is frequently triv-
ial. Once the trial starts, the Supreme Court has held that, in many situ-
ations, the state's attorney is considered a litigant entitled to the same
rights as other litigants. In Singer v. United States,39 for example, the
Court stated that "the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest
in seeing that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are
tried before the tribunal which the Constitution regards as most likely to
produce a fair result."'
Even if the state lacks constitutional rights in the formal sense, the
inquiry is not ended. The Constitution is not the only source of a liti-
gant's rights, nor do all constitutionally-based rights, however unimpor-
tant, necessarily trump all non-constitutional interests. In United States
v. Valenzuela-Bernal,41 for example, the Supreme Court balanced the
government's "vitally important" statutory duties under the immigration
laws against the defendant's constitutional right of compulsory process. 42
Although the government had deprived the trial of material witnesses by
deporting those witnesses, the Court held that the government's statu-
tory duty to deport illegal aliens outweighed the defendant's sixth
37. Id. at 329-30.
38. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946).
39. 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
40. Id. at 36.
41. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
42. Id. at 863-64, 867-71.
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amendment rights.43 Similarly, a number of states have held that the
prosecutor is entitled to the same kind of fair trial as the defendant,
regardless of whether the prosecutor's right is found in the constitution,
statutes, or the common law.44
Further, the prosecutor represents the community. Minority jurors
and minority members of the community can claim entitlement to consti-
tutional rights, including the equal protection right not to be discrimi-
nated against. In Batson, the Court stated that the harm from racist jury
selection touches the entire community, harming both the community
and the particular jurors who were excluded.45 Earlier, in Swain v. Ala-
bama,46 the Court said that racist jury selection denies blacks in the com-
munity "the same right and opportunity to participate in the
administration of justice enjoyed by the white population."'47 This
approach has already been used by several states to prohibit racially dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges by defendants.48
Indeed, a determination that either the community or the jurors
have the equal protection right to be free from racial discrimination is
essential to engaging in any kind of formal equal protection argument. If
neither the community nor the jurors fall within the scope of the equal
protection clause, then there is no one who can challenge the defendant's
conduct (beyond the trial stage), and the equal protection issue can never
be brought to the appellate courts. If that were the case, arguing about
whether defense peremptory challenges are subject to the equal protec-
tion clause would be an empty intellectual exercise. If, on the other
hand, the community or jurors do have the right to be free from discrimi-
nation-a largely undebatable point-then the question is transformed
into one of who has standing to object to a violation of those rights.
b. Standing: Does the state have standing to object to a criminal
defendant's racist use of peremptory challenges? The Court in Batson
stated that in order to complain, one must be a member of a "racial
43. Id. at 872-73.
44. See, eg., State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1984) (finding that "[t]he state, no less
than a defendant, is entitled to an impartial jury").
45. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87-88 (1986); see also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S.
187, 195 (1946) (finding that racist jury selection injures "the community at large").
46. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
47. Id. at 224, quoted in Batson, 476 U.S. at 91.
48. See, eg., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n.29, 148 Cal.
Rptr. 890, 906 n.29 (1978) ("[BIlack community as a whole has a legitimate interest in participating
in the trial proceedings.").
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group capable of being singled out for differential treatment."49 The
state obviously is not a member of a racial group. Does this mean the
state cannot have standing?50
It is doubtful that the Batson Court meant to impose any new
restrictions on equal protection standing rules by the use of this phrase.
In the Batson context, the limitation only expressed the ordinary idea
that an equal protection claim must be brought by someone who has
personally suffered from discrimination; thus, African-Americans usually
must be the ones to complain of discrimination against their race.51 The
Court undoubtedly wanted to distinguish equal protection standing from
standing to assert a sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. The
former is limited, the latter is not. There is no requirement that the per-
son complaining under the sixth amendment's impartial jury clause be a
member of the excluded group.52 If race-based exclusion of citizens from
jury service results in a violation of the sixth amendment's impartial jury
or fair cross-section requirements, then defendants of all races have been
deprived of a constitutional guarantee and may complain. Thus, the Bat-
son Court was not announcing a new standing requirement, but rather
was restating the existing distinction between the equal protection and
the impartial jury clauses.
The Supreme Court has made it clear on several occasions that
racial discrimination in jury selection constitutes harm to the community
and to the excluded jurors and that this harm is redressable under the
equal protection clause.53 Thus, the only real issue is whether the prose-
cutor has standing to object during trial, at a time when the harm could
be prevented, or whether the jurors or community representatives will
49. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.
50. Compare Pizzi, supra note 11, at 119 (arguing that Batson language is a significant obstacle
to prosecutorial standing) with Holland v. Illinois, 110 S. Ct. 803, 811 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring) (defendant's race would not be a bar to standing despite language in Batson).
51. Cf. Note, Discrimination, supra note 9, at 362-63 (viewing Batson's limitation that defend-
ant must be a member of a cognizable group as a modification of the standing requirement, though
applicable only to defendants).
52. Holland, 110 S. Ct. at 805 (white defendant has standing to raise sixth amendment chal-
lenge to exclusion of blacks from jury); see Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 359 n. 1 (1979) (male
defendant has standing to challenge the exclusion of females from jury); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419
U.S. 522, 526 (1975) (male defendant has standing to challenge the exclusion of females); Peters v.
Ki, 407 U.S. 493, 496-501 (1972) (white defendant has standing to challenge the exclusion of
blacks).
53. See Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320, 329 (1970) (injured citizens of a community
have standing to bring a class action civil suit to seek redress of discrimination in jury selection);
Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (exclusion of women, racial groups, or social
classes from jury duty harms entire community); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879)
(denying a person the right to participate in jury service harms the excluded person).
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have to bring a separate case. This is a question of third-party standing,
unaffected by the group-membership statement in Batson.
Ordinarily, the requirement of a genuine case or controversy
between the parties54 prohibits litigation of third-party claims. However,
third-party standing is sometimes given to appropriate litigants when to
do otherwise "might result in a denial of constitutional rights and.., it
would be difficult if not impossible for the persons whose rights are
asserted to present their grievance before any court."5 5
The Court in Singleton v. Wulff 56 held that third-party standing is
appropriate if two conditions are met. First, the relationship between the
litigant and the person whose rights are affected must be such that the
litigant will be as effective a proponent of the right as the affected person
would have been. 7 In other words, do the litigant and the affected per-
son share similar interests? In the Howard Beach case, the answer would
appear to be yes, because the minority members of the community had
an interest in participating in the resolution of the case, which was
exactly the same interest being asserted by the state when it objected to
the exclusion of African-Americans from the jury. Second, there must be
an obstacle preventing affected persons from asserting their right so that,
by default, the third party becomes the right's best advocate.5 8  The
obstacle in the Howard Beach case is that rules of trial procedure permit
objections only from the parties to the lawsuit,59 and jurors are not par-
ties.60 A civil suit of the kind brought in Carter v. Jury Commission6
would not prevent the defendant from exercising racist peremptory chal-
lenges in the present case. If that case is the Howard Beach trial-of
tremendous symbolic importance to the community-a delayed remedy
54. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
55. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953). For a full discussion of the third-party
standing problem, see Monaghan, Third Party Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 278-82 (1984);
Rohr, Fighting for the Rights of Others: The Troubled Law of Third-Party Standing and Mootness in
the Federal Courts, 35 U. MIAMI L. REv. 393 (1981).
56. 428 U.S. 106 (1976); see also Warth v. Sedlin, 422 U.S. 490, 500-02, 510-17 (1975)
(whether an association has standing to complain about discriminatory zoning laws depends on
whether the association clearly alleges facts demonstrating that it is a proper party to invoke judicial
resolution).
57. Singleton, 428 U.S. at 114.
58. Id. at 116.
59. See, e.g., Worth v. Dortman, 94 Mich. App. 103, 288 N.W.2d 603 (1979); State v. New-
man, 568 S.W.2d 276 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
60. In some circumstances, the judge also may assert objections sua sponte. Since the jurors
might perceive this intervention as favoritism, however, judges are not appropriate persons to protect
the rights of minority jurors. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976) (finding judge's only respon-
sibility to be the seating of an impartial jury).
61. 396 U.S. 320 (1970).
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from a civil suit is inadequate. Therefore, both tests seem to be met, and
the prosecutor should have standing to object on behalf of the affected
citizens.
c. State action: The third issue is whether the removal of prospec-
tive jurors through peremptory challenges exercised by defense attorneys
constitutes state action. Commentators have reached different conclu-
sions on this question.62
Some aspects of defense peremptory challenge procedures make
them look like private conduct. The defendants themselves are private
litigants. Some defense attorneys are privately retained, and all have an
ethical obligation to represent only their clients' interests.63 In addition,
judges take a somewhat inactive role in the peremptory challenge
procedure. 64
In other respects, however, the state is deeply involved in the per-
emptory challenge process. The entire forum of the criminal trial is a
public arena: the challenges arise in criminal proceedings initiated by the
state, conducted in public courtrooms, and supervised by judges65 who
are employees of the state. These judges are supported by a staff of
clerks, bailiffs, reporters, and other court officials. In addition, many
defense attorneys are public defenders or have been appointed and paid
by the state. The performance of defense counsel, whether appointed or
retained, is regulated by the state through bar admission rules, discipli-
nary rules, and appeals based upon ineffective assistance of counsel.66
Peremptory challenges are authorized and regulated by statute.67 The
jurors were summoned by the state, are paid by the state, and cannot go
home without permission from the state. In many jurisdictions, defend-
ants exercise their challenges through the trial judge, who then excuses
62. See Pizzi, supra note 11, at 118.
63. See Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 816; see also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.2(a) (1983) (lawyer shall abide by client's wishes and decisions).
64. See Fortune, Voir Dire in Kentucky: An Empirical Study of Voir Dire in Kentucky Circuit
Courts, 69 Ky. L.J. 273, 300-01 (1981) (survey showing wide variations in judicial practices of voir
dire).
65. See Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408, 413 (1895) (Voir dire "is conducted under the
supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion."); Stirone
v. United States, 341 F.2d 253, 256 n.3 (3d Cir. 1965) (judge must be present to supervise voir dire).
66. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1980) (actions of an ineffective, privately
retained counsel violated defendant's right to counsel under 6th and 14th amendments).
67. Eg., FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b); see J. VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES 282-84
(1977); Tanford, supra note 32, at 628-36.
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the prospective juror.6' Throughout the entire selection process, it is the
state's responsibility to seat an impartial jury6 9 and to protect the safety
and integrity of that jury during the trial.7"
The Supreme Court has found state action in cases where the state's
involvement was significantly less. In Shelley v. Kraemer,71 for instance,
all interested parties were private. The only involvement of the state
courts was the enforcement of private, racially discriminatory restrictive
covenants contained in property deeds. The Supreme Court found that
the use of the courts to enforce private discrimination constituted state
action.72 In Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Company,73 a private party used the
legal system for private ends. A court clerk and sheriff issued and exe-
cuted a writ of attachment in a private dispute between a debtor and
creditor. The Court held that even this minimal involvement by state
officials created joint action between the private party and the state and
therefore constituted state action.7 4 In Burton v. Wilmington Parking
Authority,75 the operation of a private restaurant was found to be state
action because the restaurant was located in a public facility-a munici-
pal parking garage.76 Furthermore, in Cuyler v. Sullivan,7 7 the actions of
a privately retained defense attorney were held attributable to the state.
68. See Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 815; see also Fludd v. Dykes, 863 F.2d 822, 828 (1 1th Cir.
1989) (private civil litigant's peremptory challenges were state action because they were exercised
through the court).
69. See Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 592 (1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527-
28 (1973).
70. See, eg., Williams v. State, 480 N.E.2d 953 (Ind. 1985) (judge has duty to control proceed-
ings, including potentially disruptive conduct by attorneys); State v. Franklin, 327 S.E.2d 449 (W.
Va. 1985) (judge should have banished members of Mothers Against Drunk Driving from the court-
room, as the duty to shield the jury from every possible source of pressure or prejudice overrides all
other trial rights); see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (it is essential that the judge main-
tain dignity, order, and decorum throughout court proceedings; flagrant disregard of basic standards
of conduct should not be tolerated; judges confronted with stubborn, contumacious parties must
have discretion to meet circumstances of case; party may lose even a constitutional right by engaging
in disruptive behavior).
71. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
72. Id. at 13-14, 19-20; see also Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478
(1988) (private party's use of state procedures with significant assistance of state officials constituted
state action).
73. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
74. Id. at 937, 939-42; see also Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 860 F.2d 1308, 1311-14
(5th Cir. 1989) (private litigant's use of state courts and state officials was state action for purposes of
extending Batson).
75. 365 U.S. 715, 723-24 (1961).
76. Id. at 723-24.
77. 446 U.S. 335 (1980).
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The Supreme Court noted that the "State's conduct of a criminal trial
itself implicates the State."78
In Lugar, the Court indicated that no specific bright-line rule or
semantic test should be used to determine the presence of state action.
Rather, whether private conduct is fairly attributable to the state is nec-
essarily a case-specific, fact-bound inquiry.7 9 Nevertheless, some effort
has been made to create standards for analyzing defense peremptory
challenges under what have been called the "nexus, .... public function,"
and "joint action" tests.80
Under the nexus test of Moose Lodge v. Irvis8 and Jackson v. Metro-
politan Edison Company,82 private conduct is treated as state action
when "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and the chal-
lenged [private] action."83 One commentator has referred to this as an
entanglement test.84 The jury selection process, of which defense per-
emptory challenges are an inextricable part, is a combined effort of the
defendant and numerous court officials. It takes place in a public court-
room and is part of a process to select jurors who will be temporary state
employees. The trial cannot take place until the jury is selected. Thus,
the defendant's conduct cannot realistically be disentangled from all the
state action surrounding it.
Under the public function test of Terry v. Adams" and Marsh v.
Alabama,86 the state cannot avoid its constitutional responsibilities by
delegating a public function to private parties. The obligation to seat an
impartial jury is an important state function in a criminal trial.87 One of
the justifications for peremptory challenges is to assist that process by
78. Id. at 344.
79. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937-39 (1982); see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299-300 (1966)
(generalizations do not decide cases; facts and circumstances must be sifted to determine whether
state action requirement has been satisfied).
80. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939 (finding that whether these are different tests or just different char-
acterizations of the same test is an issue that need not be resolved).
81. 407 U.S. 163 (1972). For the Court's articulation of the "nexus" test, see id. at 176.
82. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
83. Id. at 351.
84. Note, Prosecutor's Right, supra note 9, at 160; see Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 301
(1966) (discussing whether the state was "entwined" in a private park's operation).
85. 345 U.S. 461 (1953). The Court held that a private political primary represented state
action because it was the only real factor in determining who governed the country. For the Court's
discussion of the public functions test, see id. at 469-79.
86. 326 U.S. 501 (1946). The Court found that because private facilities like bridges, ferries,
turnpikes, and company towns are built and operated to benefit the public, their operation is essen-
tially a public function. Id. at 506.
87. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
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enlisting the parties' help in "eliminat[ing] extremes of partiality on both
sides."88 In other words, the state is delegating part of the responsibility
for selecting a proper jury to the litigants. This delegation of a function
that is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State89 does not
defeat state action.
Under the joint action test of Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Company,"
private conduct may be attributable to the state if it involves "the exer-
cise of some right or privilege created by the State,"91 and the private
actor "has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state
officials." 92 Certainly when defendants exercise peremptory challenges,
they exercise rights created by state statute. There is no right to peremp-
tory challenges independent of state authorization.93 Further, because
the intertwined jury selection procedure calls upon the judge, prosecutor,
and defense attorney to act together to remove the most biased persons
from the jury, the defense attorney would appear to be acting together
with state officials. Thus, under either the "nexus," the "public func-
tion," or the "joint action" tests, it would not be difficult for an appellate
court to assert a doctrinal justification that racist defense peremptory
challenges constitute state action.
d. Compelling state interest: The fourth element of the equal pro-
tection analysis of racial discrimination is whether a particular discrimi-
natory practice is justified because it is narrowly tailored to achieving a
compelling state interest. Two possible compelling reasons have been
suggested for allowing defendants to base peremptory challenges on race.
The first is that the unfettered exercise of peremptory challenges is neces-
sary for a fair trial, either because the challenges are vital to obtaining an
impartial jury, or because the defendant's right to present a defense
88. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
89. Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 159 (1978). The requirement that the public function
be traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the State does not appear to mean that the state must
always have maintained a monopoly. For example, the Marsh Court determined that running a
company town was state action although historically many towns were privately owned. Marsh, 326
U.S. at 508 n.5; see also Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (maintaining a municipal park met
the public functions test, although in many areas public parks are run by private organizations, such
as the VFW, Rotary Club, or Audubon Society).
90. 457 U.S. 922 (1982). The test articulated by the Court holds that state action will be found
when state officials are acting jointly with private parties. Id. at 932-33, 941-42; see also Tulsa Pro-
fessional Collection Serv. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478 (1988). The Court held that when private parties
make use of state procedures with significant assistance of state officials, state action may be found.
Id. at 486.
91. Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
93. See Tanford, supra note 32, at 635.
1030
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
means that the accused is entitled to any maneuver that provides a tacti-
cal advantage. This is essentially a sixth amendment claim that peremp-
tory challenges are part of the right to present a defense. Rather than
force this issue into a compelling interest analysis, however, I will con-
sider it in its sixth amendment context in the next section.
The second proposed compelling interest is protection of the defend-
ant's attorney-client privilege. Yet, while preservation of the attorney-
client privilege is undoubtedly of compelling interest to society, the inter-
est is only as extensive as the privilege itself. If a Batson-like rule requir-
ing defense attorneys to articulate non-racial reasons for challenging
prospective jurors does not violate the privilege, the defendant's interest
vanishes.
The attorney-client privilege protects the content of communica-
tions between defendants and their lawyers.94 Under a Batson-like rule,
however, no situation is likely to arise in which the content of any com-
munication must be disclosed. The only communication from client to
attorney that would have to be disclosed would be the client's reasoning
about whom to excuse. Under a Batson-type rule, illogical reasons would
not be adequate justification for the racist use of peremptory challenges.
Thus, if the client expressed a general dislike of African-Americans, this
could not be put forward as a legitimate nonracial justification for chal-
lenging jurors. Similarly, any other illogical reason expressed by the cli-
ent, such as "I don't like people whose occupations start with the letter
P; get rid of that pipe-fitter,"95 would not justify the challenge. There-
fore, illogical reasons will not be disclosed.
If the client communicates to the attorney a legitimate reason for
challenging a prospective juror-such as telling the attorney that a juror
seemed hostile to,96 avoided eye contact with,97 or seemed nervous
about9" the client-the attorney can justify the challenge by explaining
the reason, without disclosing that it was suggested by the client. A
statement by the attorney that "My reason for removing this prospective
juror is not because she is black, but because she seemed hostile to,
94. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 212-13 (3d ed. 1984). The privilege may also
protect other kinds of information not acquired from professional communication, but those are not
relevant here.
95. See United States v. Romero-Reyna, 867 F.2d 834, 836 (5th Cir. 1989) (finding that reason
not to be a valid justification).
96. See United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010-11 (5th Cir. 1987).
97. See United States v. Cartlidge, 808 F.2d 1064, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987).
98. See United States v. Hawkins, 781 F.2d 1483, 1485 (1lth Cir. 1986).
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avoided eye contact with, or appeared nervous about my client," dis-
closes no confidential communication and is therefore not within the
privilege. 99
Even if such disclosure indirectly implicates attorney-client commu-
nication, the privilege protects only those communications intended by
the client to be kept confidential. If a client communicates information
to the attorney with the understanding that the attorney will pass the
information on to others or take public action based on it, such informa-
tion is not privileged to begin with."° When the client asks the attorney
to challenge a juror, the client is asking the attorney to make those feel-
ings public, not to keep them private.'01
In any event, the attorney-client privilege is not a license to commit
illegal acts. The privilege has never applied to conspiracies between law-
yer and client to commit future crimes or frauds."0 2 If a client consults
with the lawyer about a proposed course of action and is told that the
action would be unlawful, the privilege is preserved so long as the client
desists from the unlawful conduct.103 If the client persists in committing
an illegal act, however, the privilege does not apply. Engaging in inten-
tional racial discrimination is an unlawful act. The privilege "may be a
shield ... as to crimes already committed, but it cannot be used as a
sword ... to enable persons to carry out contemplated crimes against
society. [It] does not make a law office a nest of vipers in which to hatch
out frauds and perjuries."' Just because the illegal act may gain a tacti-
cal advantage for the defendant and increase his chances of acquittal
does not bring it within the privilege. 105
99. See also United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 873 (1982) (The Court required
an attorney to state why a witness's testimony would have been favorable and material in order to
prevent deportation, assuming that, in many instances, such information would come from the
client.).
100. See Perkins v. State, 483 N.E.2d 1379, 1383 (Ind. 1985).
101. Even if the communication arguably was privileged to begin with, when it is partially dis-
closed through the attorney's conduct in exercising the challenge, there has been a waiver. See 8 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2327 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961).
102. E. CLEARY, supra note 94, at 229; see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.2(d) (1983) (lawyer shall not assist client in unlawful conduct).
103. See E. CLEARY, supra note 94, at 229 n.2.
104. Gebhardt v. United Rys., 220 S.W. 677, 679 (Mo. 1920).
105. E.g., Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 175-76 (1986) (attorney-client privilege cannot be
used to justify the use of perjured testimony, even though it would help the defendant gain an acquit-
tal); In re Doe, 551 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1977) (client's disclosure of intent to bribe a juror not
privileged).
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Even if a limitation on defense peremptory challenges does conflict
with the attorney-client privilege, the privilege will not necessarily pre-
vail. In other cases in which claims of privilege conflicted with constitu-
tional principles, the privilege had to yield. In Davis v. Alaska,106 the
Supreme Court held that a defendant's sixth amendment right of con-
frontation and cross-examination was more important than a state privi-
lege for juvenile records. The Court acknowledged the high degree of
importance of the privilege, but held that it must yield to a defendant's
legitimate assertion of an inconsistent constitutional right.107 In United
States v. Nixon,108 the Court had to decide between a general claim of
executive privilege and the "fundamental demands of due process." 109
The Supreme Court held that the Watergate defendants' need for the
information was more important than the general assertion of
privilege.110
2. Fair Trial
Given the procedural difficulties of bringing an equal protection
claim to the appellate courts, a different doctrinal question might be
more appropriate. Instead of asking whether the prosecutor can assert
equal protection to force a judge to stop racist challenges by the defense,
one could ask whether defendants have any grounds to complain if the
court imposes restrictions on them. After all, the problem in the Howard
Beach case is not that the prosecutor needs to find grounds on which to
appeal the judge's refusal to stop a racist practice. Justice Demakos did
prohibit the defendants from using their peremptory challenges to
remove jurors on account of their race. Thus, it is the defendants who
need to find grounds on which to appeal.
While the defendants could try to assert that they have an affirma-
tive right to engage in racial discrimination, that claim hardly seems pro-
ductive. If defendants are going to find constitutional grounds for
complaining about restrictions being imposed on their peremptory chal-
lenges, their best hope would be to argue that their right to conduct an
effective defense is being infringed. The basis for the claim would be
106. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
107. Id. at 319.
108. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
109. Id. at 713.
110. Id. at 711-12. The Court explained that while the President was free to try to make partic-
ular showings that certain documents should be privileged, a general assertion of privilege was inade-
quate given that an important constitutional principle was at stake. See Hill, Testimonial Privilege
and Fair Trial, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 1173, 1179-80 (1980).
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infringement of a sixth amendment right, not violation of equal protec-
tion.111 Would such a sixth amendment claim have any realistic likeli-
hood of success? I think not.
Although the sixth amendment has been interpreted as giving
defendants the general right to conduct an effective defense, 1 2 the
Supreme Court has never suggested that it guarantees attorneys the right
to employ whatever strategies they wish. 1 3 Other important govern-
mental duties may take precedence. For example, in United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal,14 the Supreme Court upheld the government's right
to deport potential witnesses over an objection that the defendant's sixth
amendment right to compulsory process was being infringed. One of the
reasons the Court gave was that the government had an obligation to
enforce the immigration laws as well as to provide a fair trial.1 5 The
possibility that government action might interfere with a defendant's
sixth amendment rights does not necessarily prevent the government
from enforcing other important legal policies,116 especially when the pos-
sibility is somewhat speculative.
The Court has also tended to interpret the sixth amendment in light
of existing state law and practice. In Lockhart v. McCree, I 7 the Court
looked to the states' practice of using unitary juries in capital cases in
deciding that the impartial jury clause did not require the use of bifur-
cated juries. 8 In Duncan v. Louisiana,19 the Court decided that the
sixth amendment right to a jury trial in "all" criminal prosecutions only
applied to non-petty offenses, stating that the clause was to be interpreted
by "refer[ing] to objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practices
111. The issue is not, as suggested in Note, Prosecutor's Right, supra note 9, at 152-53, and
Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use, supra note 9, at 58-60, whether the state can affirmatively
assert its own quasi-sixth amendment right to a fair trial and impartial jury, because it is not the
state that is bringing the appeal. The question is whether defendants' sixth amendment trial rights
are infringed when the state restricts their peremptory challenges.
112. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA.
L. REV. 544, 557 (1980).
113. Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978) (the obligation of the court to conduct a
fair trial is more important).
114. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
115. Id. at 864-66.
116. In Valenzuela-Bernal, the Court noted that the defendant had been unable to show that the
deported witnesses would have provided evidence that was material and favorable to the defense. Id.
at 872-74.
117. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
118. Id. at 181-82.
119. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
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in the Nation."12 0 In Duren v. Missouri,12' the Court pointed to the fact
that few states exempted women from jury duty as one reason for decid-
ing that such an automatic exemption contravened the sixth amend-
ment.1 21 In Ohio v. Roberts,13 the Court held that the use of hearsay
evidence that had not been subjected to cross-examination satisfied the
confrontation clause if the evidence fell within a traditional hearsay
exception as defined by general American law. 124
What would the Court find if it looked to state law in this case?
State peremptory challenge practices generally treat both sides identi-
cally. All states give peremptory challenges to both sides to be exercised
in the same manner, and most give the same number to each side.12 5
Most states that have faced the issue of whether to extend reciprocal
racial limitations to defense peremptory challenges have done so.126
These state practices suggest that the Court may not be receptive to the
suggestion that the sixth amendment requires defendants to be treated
differently.
A more specific attempt by defendants to argue that the sixth
amendment guarantee of an impartial jury grants them the right to the
unfettered exercise of peremptory challenges is also unlikely to be suc-
cessful. The Supreme Court has interpreted the impartial jury clause as
setting only a minimal standard. In Wainwright v. Witt,127 the Court
stated that the impartiality requirement is satisfied by "jurors who will
conscientiously apply the law and find the facts."' 28 As long as the
jurors promise to try to put aside their biases and do a conscientious job
as jurors, the court is not even required to look for and weed out racial
prejudices on the jury panel. "9 Instead, the impartiality requirement is
120. Id. at 161. Because the sixth amendment states that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a ... trial, by an impartial jury," U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis
added), the Court's decision to deny a jury for petty criminal prosecutions was in derogation of the
language of the Constitution.
121. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
122. Id. at 359-60.
123. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
124. Id. at 66.
125. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 67, at 282-84 (summarizing state laws); Tanford, supra note
32, at 635 (summarizing state laws).
126. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr.
890, 906 n.29 (1978); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481, 487 (Fla. 1984); Commonwealth v. Soares, 377
Mass. 461, 489 n.35, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517 n.35 (1979).
127. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
128. Id. at 423, quoted in Lockhart v. MeCree, 476 U.S. 162, 178 (1986).
129. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 595 (1976) (state's obligation to seat impartial jury does not
require an inquiry into whether they have biases); see also Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215-16
(1982) (juror who had applied for a job with the district attorney's office and whose application was
1990] 1035
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.63:1015
satisfied by a juror's good faith promise to put aside biases and be fair to
both sides. Any juror who cannot make this promise may be challenged
for cause. 130  Therefore, all constitutionally impartial jurors can be
removed before peremptory challenges are exercised. Peremptory chal-
lenges may help the defendant go further and pick a favorable jury, but
that is not what the sixth amendment promises by the term
"impartial.", 131
Indeed, the weight of Supreme Court precedent is against any argu-
ment that peremptory challenges are necessary to assure a constitutional
jury. In Stilson v. United States,132 the Court held "[t]here is nothing in
the Constitution of the United States which requires [granting] peremp-
tory challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury
is all that is secured."' 133 In Swain v. Alabama 134 and again in Batson,'35
the Court said that peremptory challenges were not a constitutional
right. 136 Any juror proved to be partial is subject to challenge for cause.
Peremptory challenges, therefore, are by definition used only against
jurors who cannot be shown to be biased. Moreover, the number of per-
emptory challenges may be limited by statute-reduced to as few as two
or three-without running afoul of the Constitution. 137 Justice Marshall
even suggested in Batson that peremptory challenges could be eliminated
altogether if necessary to eliminate racial discrimination. 13 Therefore, it
is difficult for a defendant to mount a persuasive case that there is a con-
stitutional right to engage in the unfettered exercise of peremptory
challenges.
139
pending during trial met the constitutional standard of impartiality because he had promised to be
fair to both sides).
130. See Ky. R. CRIM. P. 9.36(1) (If reasonable grounds develop "to believe that a prospective
juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict on the evidence," it is subject to challenge for
cause.); N.C. GEN STAT. § 15A-1212 (1983) (similar); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 659 (West 1969);
see also Tanford, supra note 32, at 634 (general discussion).
131. See Commonwealth v. Reid, 384 Mass. 247,253-54,424 N.E.2d 495, 499 (1981) (Because a
defendant's right to exercise peremptory challenges is only statutory, a trial court may restrict that
right without violating the constitution.).
132. 250 U.S. 583 (1919).
133. Id. at 586; accord Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988).
134. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
135. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
136. Batson, 476 U.S. at 91; Swain, 380 U.S. at 219.
137. See Tanford, supra note 32, at 635.
138. Batson, 476 U.S. at 107 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("If the prosecutor's peremptory chal-
lenge could be eliminated only at the cost of eliminating the defendant's challenge as well, I do not
think that would be too great a price to pay." Id. at 108.).
139. See supra note 115; see also Note, Discrimination, supra note 9, at 366 (making similar
arguments); cf. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 550-
63 (1975) (arguing that defense peremptory challenges should have a constitutional basis).
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III. THE COMPATIBILITY OF RACIST PEREMPTORY
CHALLENGES WITH THE NORMS OF THE TRIAL
PROCESS
Formal doctrinal analysis answers whether a court logically can
prohibit defendants from exercising racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges without radically departing from the usual legal conventions.
Whether the Supreme Court should impose restrictions, however, is a
normative issue operating at three levels. The broadest theoretical ques-
tion is whether to conduct the debate within the traditional individual-
rights framework of liberal political philosophy, or to start from a com-
munitarian perspective. A second question is whether restricted or
unrestricted challenges are more compatible with the norms of the trial
system generally. The third question is utilitarian: Do race-based per-
emptory challenges in fact serve any important role in a trial?
A. THE TRADITIONAL NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK:
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
1. The Claim That Defendants Deserve Special Protection
The normative assumptions underlying the criminal justice system
have traditionally been drawn from liberal political theory. That theory
holds that the most important principle in criminal trials is the protec-
tion of the individual rights of defendants against the arbitrary exercise
of power by the state. 1" Adherents to liberal theory suggest that defend-
ants should be allowed unfettered freedom to excuse jurors as they see fit
and posit three reasons why Batson should not be extended: (1) the
adversary system in general is supposed to be asymmetrical in favor of
the rights of defendants; (2) defense peremptory challenges in particular
deserve special protection; and (3) requiring the defendant to justify per-
emptory challenges would inappropriately chill the attorney-client
relationship.
The first assertion is that the adversary criminal justice system is
premised on an asymmetry between the opposing sides in which the liti-
gative advantage belongs to the accused."' This policy is supposedly
140. See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 16 (1964); Rhode,
supra note 8, at 594; Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary System, 64 IND. L.J.
301, 310-12 (1989); Terrell, Rights and Wrongs in the Rush to Repose: On the Jurisprudential Dan-
gers of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 36 EMORY L.J. 541, 545 (1987).
141. See Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 821, 825 nn.105-06 (citing six cases in support of the
asymmetry proposition). Goldwasser dismisses language in court opinions to the contrary as based
on a lack of understanding, confusion, and a misreading of precedent. Id. at 823-25.
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apparent from the fact that the defendant has constitutional rights, while
the prosecution does not. Adherents to this policy justify it by arguing
that defendants' rights are necessary to redress the state's advantage in
resources and power. 42 They support the argument with language to
this effect in some concurring and dissenting Supreme Court opinions. 143
Two common examples that are said to illustrate this policy are (1) the
state has a constitutional obligation to provide discovery to the defense,
while the defense has no reciprocal constitutional duty;"4 and (2) the
state bears the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 145
The second assertion is that regardless of whether defendants should
generally be given a litigative advantage, there are some special reasons
why defendants should be permitted the unfettered exercise of peremp-
tory challenges. For example, Professor Goldwasser claims that peremp-
tory challenges were originally adopted in this country as devices to
protect defendants 146 from government oppression, 147 "the corrupt or
overzealous prosecutor and . . . the compliant, biased, or eccentric
judge."' 48 One could also make the utilitarian argument that because an
attorney may not be able to build a record that will support a challenge
142. See id. at 821-22.
143. E.g., Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 480 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring) (The Constitu-
tion does not envision equality between parties.); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 111-12 (1970)
(Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (The Bill of Rights was designed to give tactical
advantage to accused.).
144. See Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 822. Of course, in most jurisdictions, the defense has a
reciprocal duty of discovery required by statute. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
145. See Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 822. Goldwasser suggests two other examples, but they
are not persuasive. She states that only defendants have the right to hear other witnesses before
testifying, and only the defendant can consult with counsel during trial. In fact, the prosecution is
generally entitled to have its principal investigator remain in the courtroom during trial for consulta-
tion and to listen to other witnesses, so balance is maintained. See In re United States, 584 F.2d 666,
667 (5th Cir. 1978). The cases Goldwasser cites, see Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 822 nn.87-88,
establish only that the defendant has these rights, not that the prosecution lacks them. See, e.g.,
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 607-13 (1972) (statute requiring defendant to testify first
infringed fifth amendment rights and right to consult with counsel).
146. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 827-28. Goldwasser asserts that peremptory challenges were
first created by an English statute in 1305 that made them available only to defendants. This is true
but misleading. The statute did not grant peremptory challenges to the Crown because it did not
need them. The prosecution was entitled to exercise an unlimited number of "stand-asides." Stand-
asides, like peremptory challenges, could be exercised for any reason and did not have to be justified.
Giving a few peremptory challenges to the defense partially rectified the imbalance caused by the
one-sided stand-aside system, but still left the prosecution with an overall advantage. See Note,
Prosecutor's Right, supra note 9, at 146-47.
147. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970) (peremptory challenges intended to pre-
vent oppression by government); Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 31 (1965) (jury trial clause
intended to protect accused from oppression by government).
148. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). It is unclear how the racist use of peremp-
tory challenges would further the goal of protecting the defendant from governmental oppression.
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for cause, 149 or because judges sometimes wrongly deny such chal-
lenges,' 50 peremptory challenges are important to "eliminate extremes of
partiality on both sides." '151 Finally, it could be argued that peremptory
challenges are symbolically important to defendants, allowing them to
express their personal dislikes, giving them some sense of control over
the proceedings, and acknowledging their unique stake in the trial.' 52
The third policy argument for special protection of defense peremp-
tory challenges is that an inquiry into their validity would chill the free-
dom necessary for an effective attorney-client relationship. Professor
Goldwasser suggests that "defense attorneys' awareness of the possibility
of inquiry may deter them from speaking freely with their clients during
jury selection."' 153 Additionally, requiring that defense counsel publicly
reveal tactical reasons for peremptory challenges "could only diminish
the defendant's confidence in counsel."' 54 Therefore, the argument con-
cludes, Batson should not be extended to defendants.
2. The Argument Against Special Privileges for Defense Peremptory
Challenges
There are two responses to the claim that the defendant is entitled to
special consideration. First, one can argue that the implicit liberal prem-
ise of the natural superiority of individual rights over communitarianism
is wrong as a matter of critical morality. Or, at least, it is not necessarily
the only normative framework within which to analyze the issue of racist
peremptory challenges. I will explore the communitarian alternative in
section b. Second, one can also argue that, even staying well within
traditional rights-based liberal theory, a better case can be made for the
149. See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 30-31 (1986); Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 592
(1976); Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 525-26 (1973). In all three of these cases the trial
judge refused to allow anyone to ask the jurors if they harbored racial prejudices.
150. See Babcock, supra note 139, at 549-50. If legitimate challenges for cause are wrongly
denied, then the defendant can appeal and usually obtain a new trial. See, ag., People v. Taylor, 101
Ill. 2d 377, 399, 462 N.E.2d 478, 488 (1984). But cf Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81 (1988) (The
Court concedes that a challenge for cause was wrongly denied, which would usually require reversal,
but upholds conviction on a combination of procedural default and harmless error.).
151. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 828 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)).
152. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 829-31 (citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353).
153. Id. at 833. Professor Goldwasser gives no example of such a situation, however.
154. Id. The meaning of this statement is unclear, and Goldwasser offers no example. If she
means that the inability of a lawyer to state sensible reasons for peremptory challenges will diminish
a client's confidence in that lawyer's abilities, the concern seems trivial. If she means that an impor-
tant dimension of client trust is how effectively the lawyer preserves client confidences, this is not
harmed when the lawyer consults with her client and then articulates a reason for exercising a
challenge.
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opposite conclusion. Defendants should be prohibited from making race-
based challenges, as are prosecutors, based on an analysis of the general
principles of the adversary system, the role played by peremptory chal-
lenges in the trial process, and the impact of judicial review on the attor-
ney-client relationship.
a. The symmetrical nature of the adversary system: The essence of
our adversary system of dispute resolution is symmetry. As between two
litigants, including the state and defendant, the rules of procedure are
supposed to be balanced. No party should have an advantage apart from
the strengths and weaknesses of its case. The Supreme Court has empha-
sized this point over and over. In Hayes v. Missouri,'55 the Court held
that a fair criminal trial requires "not only freedom from any bias against
the accused, but also from any prejudice against his prosecution.
Between him and the state the scales are to be evenly held."' 6 In Her-
ring v. New York,' 57 the Court held that the adversary system requires
similar "partisan advocacy on both sides."' 8 In Kimmelman v. Morri-
son,'5 9 the Court said that without "adversarial balance between defense
and prosecution," a trial would be "rendered unfair and the verdict ren-
dered suspect."'"6
To avoid upsetting this balance, the Court generally has been hostile
to trial rules that would lopsidedly favor defendants. In Trammel v.
United States, 61 the Court abrogated the privilege against adverse
spousal testimony, which had given the defendant exclusive control over
whether his spouse could testify.' 62 In United States v. Gillock,163 the
Court squelched the efforts of some circuit courts to create an evidentiary
privilege for state legislators accused of wrongdoing. ", In United States
v. Inadi,165 the Court refused to interpret the hearsay rule and confronta-
tion clause166 in a way that would have required the state, but not the
155. 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
156. Id. at 70. This passage was quoted approvingly by both sides in Batson. Batson v. Ken-
tucky, 476 U.S. 79, 107 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 126 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
157. 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
158. Id. at 862.
159. 477 U.S. 365 (1986).
160. Id. at 374.
161. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
162. Id. at 53.
163. 445 U.S. 360 (1980).
164. Id. at 374.
165. 475 U.S. 387 (1986).
166. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, cl. 5.
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defendant, to prove a declarant unavailable in all instances. 167 And, in
two cases interpreting the scope of the constitutional exclusionary rule,
the Court held that defendants were not entitled to any special excep-
tions and could be impeached by extrinsic evidence of their otherwise
inadmissible prior inconsistent acts and statements, just like other wit-
nesses. In both cases, the Court emphasized that it is essential to the
proper functioning of the adversary system that the state be a full and
equal player in the game.
168
To be sure, the adversary system is not perfectly symmetrical. How-
ever, when there is occasional asymmetry, it is just as likely to favor the
state as it is to favor the defense. The common misperception that within
the adversary system the litigative advantage usually is given to the
accused1 69 is incompatible with the way most rules of evidence and trial
procedure operate.
What litigative advantages are given to the defense? Four come
readily to mind: (1) the state must prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt;170 (2) the state must disclose exculpatory evidence;' 71 (3) the
defendant has the right to refuse to testify; 172 and (4) the defendant may
decide to offer evidence of character.173 It is an exaggeration, however,
to suggest that the defendant derives significant benefits from these
"advantages." Empirical studies show that jurors draw little distinction
between proof beyond a reasonable doubt and proof by a preponderance
of evidence,"' 4 that if a defendant refuses to testify he is more likely to be
167. Inadi, 475 U.S. at 392-94, 396-97. It had been argued that the additional showing was
required by the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI, cl. 5.
168. Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626-
27 (1980); see Bradley, Havens, Jenkins and Salvucci and the Defendant's "Right" to Testify, 18 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 419 (1981) (discussing cases); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08
(1984) (limiting the scope of the exclusionary rule because excluding incriminating evidence gener-
ates disrespect for the law and the administration of justice).
169. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 821.
170. E.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
171. E.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
172. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
173. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
174. See R. SIMON, THE JURY: ITS ROLE IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 56 (1980) (Tables 4-4 and 4-
5) (juror quantifications of burdens of proof averaged 77% certainty for preponderance of the evi-
dence and 79% certainty for beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Simon & Mahan, Quantifying
Burdens of Proofi A View From the Bench, the Jury, and the Classroom, 5 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 319
(1971) (finding that jurors have difficulty understanding the "preponderance of evidence" standard);
Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 JUDICATURE 478, 480-81 (1976) (After
being given an instruction on the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt,
50% ofjurors did not understand presumption of innocence, and 23% thought the defendant should
be convicted if the evidence was evenly balanced.).
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convicted, 175 and that character evidence may decrease rather than
increase favorable verdicts. 176
Not only are the benefits of these defense advantages relatively insig-
nificant, but other rules of evidence and trial procedure give substantial
litigative advantages to the state. In capital cases, for instance, the state
may exclude jurors opposed to the death penalty, while the defendant
may not automatically exclude jurors who favor the death penalty. 177
Psychologists have demonstrated that this death-qualification process
produces a jury significantly conviction-prone and uncommonly willing
to condemn the defendant to death.'78 In addition, the state may join
multiple offenses or offenders into a single trial,'7 9 although such joinder
has been shown to increase the conviction rate. 80 The rules of evidence
also permit the state to prove that the defendant has a record of prior
similar criminal activity for a host of purposes.' 8 ' Empirical research
175. See Shaffer, The Defendant's Testimony, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL
PROCEDURE 124, 143-44 (S. Kassin & L. Wrightsman eds. 1985) (summarizing the literature on the
decision by defendants to testify).
176. See Borgida, Character Proof and the Fireside Induction, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189, 200
(1979) (Calling several character witnesses on behalf of a civil plaintiff reduced the number of
favorable verdicts.).
177. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987); Gray v, Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987);
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985); Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). The Court holds that the State may remove prospective jurors who
"might" be, or are "likely" to be, biased against it, because we cannot expect jurors always to be able
to express their biases clearly. See Witt, 469 U.S. at 424-26 (trial court may rely on finding of
implied bias). The Court also holds, however, that a defendant must prove actual bias against him
or her in order to remove a juror. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 214-16 (1982) (forbidding
district court from taking action based on implied bias).
178. See Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death Qualification on Jurors'Predispo-
sition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 67-69, 73-75 (1984);
Hans, Death by Jury, in CHALLENGING CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 151-55 (K. Haas & J. Incardi eds.
1988); Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a "Death Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Pro-
cess, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567, 582-85 (1971); see also Brief for the American Psychological Ass'n,
Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986) (no. 84-1865), reprinted in 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 59
(1987) (reviewing literature).
179. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8; see United States v. Pierce, 733 F.2d 1474 (11th Cir. 1984) (joinder is
favored); United States v. Nolan, 700 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1983) (joinder remains the rule rather than
the exception), cert. denied, 462 U.S. 1123 (1983).
180. See Bordens & Horowitz, Joinder of Criminal Offenses: A Review of the Legal and Psycho-
logical Literature, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 339, 343-50 (1985) (summarizing research); Greene &
Loftus, When Crimes are Joined at Trial, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 193, 196-98, 201-07 (1985);
Tanford & Penrod, Biases in Trials Involving Defendants Charged with Multiple Offenses, 12 J.
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 453, 470-78 (1982); Tanford, Penrod & Collins, Decision Making in
Joined Criminal Trials: The Influence of Charge Similarity, Evidence Similarity, and Limiting
Instructions, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 319, 332-33 (1985).
181. FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (for "proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident"). See generally E. IMWINKELREID, UNCHARGED
MISCONDUCT EVIDENCE (1984) (for a thorough critical review of the law in this area).
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shows that similar crime evidence increases the likelihood of obtaining a
conviction.18 Additionally, many rape victim shield laws prevent
defendants from offering evidence relevant to their innocence. 183
The hearsay rules also favor the state by providing numerous excep-
tions for out-of-court declarations that help the prosecution but few for
declarations that help defendants. Prior statements of identification
made by victims are admissible.' Prior statements made by the defend-
ant may be offered against the defendant, but not in the defendant's own
favor.185 Likewise, statements of co-conspirators may be offered against
a defendant but not in his or her favor.'86 Incriminating statements
made by child sex abuse victims are admissible, 87 as are dying declara-
tions naming the assailant.'88 Declarations against interest are easily
admissible if they incriminate a defendant, but if "offered to exculpate
the accused [are] not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."' 8 9
To argue that the criminal justice system should give the defendant a
litigative advantage seems a plausible position. After all, the defendant
has a great deal at stake. The impact of a wrongful conviction on the
accused is enormous and immediate, while the impact of a wrongful
acquittal on any particular individual is remote and speculative.'9" It is
naive, however, to claim that the criminal justice system does in fact give
the defendant a litigative advantage.
b. The unimportance of peremptory challenges: Regardless of
whether trials generally should be structured to give defendants a litiga-
tive advantage, is there any reason to believe that defense peremptory
182. See Doob & Kirschenbaum, Some Empirical Evidence on the Effect ofS. 12 of the Canada
Evidence Act Upon an Accused, 15 CRIM. L.Q. 88, 93-96 (1972); Hans & Doob, Section 12 of the
Canada Evidence Act and the Deliberations of Simulated Juries, 18 CRIM. L.Q. 235, 242-43 (1975);
L.S.E. Jury Project, Juries and the Rules of Evidence, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 208, 215-18; Wissler &
Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions: When Jurors Use Prior Conviction Evidence to
Decide on Guilt, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 37, 43-47 (1985).
183. See Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 112, at 578-89.
184. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(C); see also United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988) (hearsay
evidence of prior identification admissible despite witness's subsequent loss of memory).
185. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2) (The defendant may not offer his own prior statements that favor
him.).
186. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) (The defendant may not offer statements of co-conspirators in
his own behalf.).
187. See IND. CODE § 35-37-4-6 (1986).
188. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2).
189. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
190. It is speculative whether the defendant will commit any future crimes and, if he or she
does, there is only a remote chance that any particular individual will be the victim.
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challenges are so essential to the fairness of the trial that they should be
given special protection? I think not, because peremptory challenges are
not important to the pursuit of any legitimate litigative purpose.
Peremptory challenges are not an isolated trial procedure, but occur
in the overall context of jury selection. The jury commissioner arranges
a panel of prospective jurors that must be drawn from a fair cross-section
of the community. 9' Genuinely biased members of that panel are then
removed by challenges for cause. Therefore, the tentative jury that exists
before peremptory challenges are exercised can be expected to represent
a reasonable balance of those voices'92 in the community that have no
specific interest in the case to be tried. This is the impartial jury "of the
State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed"' 93 that
is envisioned by the sixth amendment.
Within any community there will be a range of voices, some more
favorable or sympathetic to defendants, some inclined against them.
Attorneys use peremptory challenges to engage in "comparison shop-
ping" for favorable jurors, not to remove biased ones.' 94 As long as both
sides have equal buying power, the inherent balance is preserved. If,
however, the defendant is given greater freedom to exercise peremptory
challenges than the state, then the defendant has the power not to move
toward a fair, balanced jury, but to move away from a balanced jury and
toward a jury in the defendant's favor.' 95 Such a power frustrates rather
than facilitates the achievement of a representative jury drawn from a
fair cross-section of the community.
For this reason, most courts that have considered the matter have
concluded that equal treatment of peremptory challenges is preferable to
unequal treatment. If the state is to be restricted in the racial use of
peremptory challenges, similar restrictions should likewise be imposed
on the defendant so that the goal of a representative jury is not compro-
mised. State courts from Florida, Massachusetts, and California have
191. See, eg., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (underinclusion of women); Hernandez
v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954) (underinclusion of Mexican-Americans).
192. The word "voice" is borrowed from C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1982), and is
intended to convey the same notion of uniqueness.
193. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 184 (1986); see also
Gobert, In Search of the Impartial Jury, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 269, 275-76 (1988) (An
impartial jury is one not acquainted with the parties or the facts and with no personal interest in
case.).
194. See Pizzi, supra note 11, at 126.
195. See Note, Discrimination, supra note 9, at 365.
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used this rationale to extend the ban against race-based peremptory chal-
lenges to defendants.' 96
This conclusion is consistent with the historical treatment of per-
emptory challenges. The early history of jury selection in England shows
that the prosecution, not the defense, was given the advantage. Prior to
1305, the Crown could order an unlimited number of prospective jurors
to stand aside, replace recalcitrant pro-defense jurors with those willing
to vote for conviction, and imprison jurors who had the audacity to
return a verdict of not guilty.1 97 The defendant had no power to chal-
lenge jurors, except for cause. It was hardly a procedural system that
favored defendants. In 1305, a statute gave defendants a limited number
of peremptory challenges for the first time. The Crown, however, still
had all its powers intact.19 Thus, while it may be technically true that
defendants historically were entitled to peremptory challenges and the
prosecution was not,19 9 it is difficult to argue that this reflects a policy
that defendants should have a litigative advantage.
The history of peremptory challenges in this country must be viewed
in the context of these English practices favoring the Crown. For exam-
ple, in Duncan v. Louisiana,"° the Supreme Court, in a frequently
quoted passage, summarized the history of jury trials in America. It sug-
gested that juries were intended as "a protection against arbitrary rule"
and a "barrier ... between the liberties of the people and the preroga-
tive" of the state.201 Jury trials were necessary "to prevent oppression by
the Government," and were "an inestimable safeguard against the cor-
rupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or
196. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 282 n.29, 583 P.2d 748, 765 n.29, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
906 n.29 (1978) ("The People no less than individual defendants are entitled to a trial by an impartial
jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community."); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481,
487 (Fla. 1984) ("The state, no less than the defendant, is entitled to an impartial jury."); Common-
wealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 489 n.35, 387 N.E.2d 499, 517 n.35 (1979) ("[W]e deem the Com-
monwealth equally to be entitled to a representative jury, unimpaired by improper exercise of
peremptory challenges by the defense.").
197. The general history of trial by jury is summarized in numerous sources. See, e.g., W.
FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY (1852); J. VAN DYKE, supra note 67, at 1-21; Gobert, supra
note 193, at 273-82; Thayer, The Jury and Its Development, 5 HARV. L. REV. 249 (1892).
198. See J. VAN DYKE, supra note 67, at 146-48; Pizzi, supra note 11, at 148; Note, Prosecutor's
Right, supra note 9, at 171 n.32.
199. See Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 827.
200. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
201. Id. at 151.
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eccentric judge."2 °2 In their historical context, these statements repre-
sent a call for jury trials as opposed to non-jury trials, and for fair, equal
treatment. A demand for an end to the English system that was rigged in
favor of the state, however, is not the same thing as the creation of a
system favoring criminal defendants."0 3
Unfettered defense peremptory challenges are also hard to justify on
pragmatic grounds. Although lawyers often claim that clever exercise of
peremptory challenges can substantially increase their chances of win-
ning at trial,2" the claim is dubious. Lawyers have no way of knowing
what verdict the jury would have returned had it been composed differ-
ently. The only empirical study of the issue concludes that the "collec-
tive performance of the attorneys is not impressive." 05 Professors
Diamond and Zeisel conducted an experiment in which jurors who had
been excused were asked to remain as shadow jurors throughout the
trial. At the end, they were asked how they would have voted. Results
showed that attorneys' choices hurt their cases as often as they helped
them.206
The claim also has been made that peremptory challenges are useful,
if not necessary, in eliminating "extremes of partiality on both sides. 2 °7
This claim seems false on its face. If a juror is indeed extremely biased,
that juror is subject to a challengefor cause. If the trial judge wrongfully
denies a challenge for cause, the defendant can appeal that issue. There-
fore, both challenges for cause and the right to appeal serve as useful
procedures for assuring that extremely biased jurors are removed. The
question is what role remains for peremptory challenges after the genu-
inely biased jurors are removed? At best, they are useful in eliminating
basically impartial but slightly biased jurors.
202. Id. at 155-56. This is a somewhat Pollyannish view ofjury competence, politics, and cour-
age. See Gobert, supra note 193, at 282:
[G]iven the awe and respect with which jurors regard judges, it is probably unrealistic
to expect them to expose, even if they were aware of it, judicial bias, eccentricity, or com-
placency....
As for prosecutors, judges are more qualified than jurors to expose corruption or
overzealousness on their part and better equipped to deal with it.
203. But cf Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898) ("It must.., be taken that... the
words 'trial by jury' were placed in the Constitution of the United States with reference to the
meaning affixed to them in the law as it was... in England at the time .... ").
204. See, e.g., A. MORRILL, supra note 29, at 1; R. WENKE, supra note 29, at 5; Zeisel & Dia-
mond, supra note 29, at 491.
205. Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 29, at 517.
206. Id. at 516 (Table 9).
207. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 828 (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965)); see
also Babcock, supra note 139, at 549-50 (claiming without empirical support that legitimate chal-
lenges for cause are often denied).
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In many cases, however, defendants who are guilty may not be
interested in truly impartial jurors. Instead, these defendants would
rather have jurors who are biased in their favor and might acquit them
despite the evidence. In such cases, peremptory challenges will not be
used to eliminate even slightly biased jurors, but to eliminate neutral
jurors in the hope that favorable jurors will replace them. Such chal-
lenges, especially ones to dismiss jurors on the assumption that their race
will determine how they vote, generally rely on stereotypes. 20 8 Empirical
research demonstrates, however, that stereotypes are poor predictors of
how jurors will vote. Thus, these challenges are again not likely to be of
significant benefit to defendants.2 °9
The last argument is that defendants deserve unfettered peremptory
challenges for symbolic reasons. For example, Professor Goldwasser
argues that allowing removal of jurors based on intuitive dislikes is of
symbolic importance to individual defendants but not to the state
because the state is an "aggregate. ' ' 210 This argument is too broad, how-
ever. The logical consequence of this argument is that corporate defend-
ants should not be allowed unrestricted peremptory challenges because
they are also aggregates without personal intuition. A rule that would
apply different standards to individual defendants and corporate defend-
ants, however, would be difficult to justify under current equal protection
law.
c. The incompatibility of racist peremptory challenges with trial
norms other than adversariness: While individual dignity and adversari-
ness are values integral to our trial system,21 they are not its exclusive
norms. Even if a plausible argument could be made that the principle of
adversariness supports asymmetrical peremptory challenge rules favoring
defendants, the issue would not be settled. One would still have to ask
whether such a rule was compatible with other normative principles of
the litigation process: Would it help achieve accurate verdicts? What
208. Cf. Babcock, supra note 139, at 553 (peremptory challenges based on "the core of truth in
most common stereotypes").
209. See R. HASTIE, S. PENROD & N. PENNINGTON, INSIDE THE JURY 121-50 (1983); Hans &
Vidmar, Jury Selection, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 63-72 (N. Kerr & R. Bray eds.
1982).
210. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 831.
211. See Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure: The Warren and Burger
Courts' Competing Ideologies, 72 GEo. L.J. 185, 197-99 (1983); Terrell, supra note 140, at 545.
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symbolic effect would it have? Will it help preserve order? Is it consis-
tent with the need for an efficient dispute resolution system?212
i. Verdict accuracy: The Supreme Court's jurisprudence of trials
does not show a one dimensional concern for preserving the trial's adver-
sary structure at all costs. Commentators have observed that "[t]he
Court's decisions reflect.., a preoccupation with accurate results in indi-
vidual cases,"'2 13 and that the "mission of the criminal justice system is to
convict the guilty and let the innocent go free." '214 The Court itself has
said repeatedly that trials have a "truth-finding function." 2 5  Opinion
after opinion emphasizes the very nature of a trial as "a search for
truth" '216 and contains statements such as "[tihere is no gainsaying that
arriving at the truth is a fundamental goal of our legal system; ' 217 "the
normally predominant principle [is that] of utilizing all rational means
for ascertaining truth;"2 the mission of trial law is to advance "the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials; '2 9 and the
law should "augment accuracy in the factfinding process. "220
212. For a general discussion of the diverse normative principles of trials, see Arenella, supra
note 211, at 197-202; Sward, supra note 140, at 303-19; Tanford, The Limits of a Scientific Jurispru-
dence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. (in press); Tanford, A Political-Choice
Approach to Limiting Prejudicial Evidence, 64 IND. L.J. 831 (1989) [hereinafter Tanford, Political-
Choice].
213. Chase, The Burger Court, the Individual and the Criminal Process: Directions and Misdi-
rections, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 518, 519 (1977).
214. C. WHITEBREAD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 4 (1980).
215. Eg., Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980). It is difficult to judge how sincere the
Justices are about the need for accurate verdicts. In every case in which the Court emphasizes its
importance, the evidence or procedure at issue will help the prosecution obtain a conviction, so it is
possible that arguments about truth-seeking are disingenuously masking the Justices' anti-defendant
biases. See, eg., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (approving use of conviction-prone
juries despite the likelihood that they will return inaccurate convictions); Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S.
1, 15 (1983) (repeated trials to establish the truth about a single criminal episode is a misuse of
judicial resources if the trial resulted in a conviction the first time); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 129
(1982) (restricting collateral review of convictions even when errors affected the truth-finding func-
tion of the trial); see also United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 157 (1982) (Court criticizes defendant
for a "long series of collateral attacks on his sentence," despite the fact that most of his motions were
successful).
216. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 174 (1986).
217. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980).
218. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (citing Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
219. United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 396 (1986) (quoting Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409,
415 (1985)).
220. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980); cf. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163
(1982) (Justice O'Connor asserts that accurate verdicts are important because they are more efficient
than retrials.).
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The question of extending Batson to defendants must therefore
include consideration of whether the accuracy of verdicts will be
increased or decreased by such a rule. Heterogeneity on the jury is likely
to produce more disagreement than homogeneity. This is especially true
in the case of race, where persons of different races may perceive events
and participants differently.221 More disagreement should produce a jury
that will spend more time discussing the facts and their application to the
law. Logically, then, the greater the range of voices on a jury, the more
thorough the deliberation will be, which should produce more accurate
verdicts.222
In addition, a heterogenous jury is less likely to share common
biases that might interfere with an accurate evaluation of the facts.223 If
the defendant is able to remove members of a particular race from the
jury, the result can only be to reduce the voices participating in the deci-
sion. Psychological research has shown that reducing diversity reduces
the accuracy of group decisions.224
ii. Symbolic value: The Supreme Court's decisions also indicate
concern with the symbolism of criminal trials. After all, criminal trials
are among the most visible legal institutions. Many of the cases in which
the Court has expressed concerns over symbolism have involved ques-
tions about the composition of the jury itself. In Williams v. Florida,225
221. See Hepburn, The Objective Reality of Evidence and the Utility of Systematic Jury Selection,
4 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 95 (1980) (jurors find persons of different races less credible); Johnson,
Black Innocence and the White Jury, 83 MICH. L. REv. 1611, 1626-33 (1985) (race of defendant
affects determination of guilt); id. at 1634-35 (race of victim affects determination of guilt);
Ugwuegbu, Racial and Evidential Factors in Juror Attribution of Legal Responsibility, 15 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 133, 138-42 (1979) (Persons from different races are perceived by jurors
to be more culpable.).
222. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 389 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("[E]arnest
and robust argument" is necessary to reach an accurate verdict.).
223. See Zeisel,... And Then There Were None: The Diminution of the Federal Jury, 38 U.
CHI. L. REV. 710, 715-16 (1971); see also Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978) ("[The
counterbalancing of various biases is critical to the accurate application of the common sense of the
community to the facts of any given case.").
224. See, eg., Hoffman, Group Problem Solving, in ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY (L. Berkowitz ed. 1965) (heterogenous groups are more accurate at solving problems).
See generally S. KASSIN & L. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL 174-80 (1988) (dis-
cussing psychological literature on effects of conformity on jury deliberations); Hans & Vidmar,
supra note 209, at 42-43 (reviewing the psychological literature on the differences between hetero-
and homogenous groups' problem solving abilities).
225. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
1990] 1049
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63:1015
the Court discussed the symbolic importance of the jury as the demo-
cratic bulwark against government oppression.226 In Ballard v. United
States,227 the Court stated that excluding racial minorities from juries
does injury "to the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our
courts. '228 In Swain v. Alabama,229 the Justices emphasized that jury
selection procedures must satisfy the appearance of justice.230 In Batson
itself, the Court reiterated this concern, fearing that racist jury selection
would "undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of
justice. 231
It is certainly true that showing symbolic respect for the rights of
the individual is important. That does not mean, however, that other
symbolic values should be ignored. The removal of African-Americans
or any other racial minority from the jury-no matter who is responsible
for the challenge-is bad political symbolism. At a time when there is
serious concern over renewed racial tension in parts of this country, "a
system that allows [trials] to begin... by removing all or substantially all
the racial minorities on the jury panel sends exactly the wrong message
to our citizens., 232 It threatens public confidence in the criminal justice
system, especially among minorities, at "a time when nearly one out of
two persons admitted to prisons in this country is black [and] there are
deep concerns over racial discrimination in the imposition of the death
penalty. '233 Members of the excluded group may come to see the law as
treating them unequally in this situation and therefore likely to treat
them unequally in other situations as well.2"4 If the defendants in the
Howard Beach case can remove all minority jurors, the result is that only
the white citizens of Howard Beach are permitted to resolve a case vitally
important to both blacks and whites. It is difficult to justify the symbol-
ism of white domination that such an act carries.
226. Id. at 100; see also Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1972) (citing the symbolic
importance of a jury).
227. 329 U.S. 187 (1946).
228. Id. at 195.
229. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
230. Id. at 219.
231. 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986); see also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975) (noting that
the exclusion of women from jury duty is at odds with the basic concept of a democratic society);
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 n.4 (1954) ("Distinctions [based on Hispanic] ancestry are by
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality.").
232. Pizzi, supra note 11, at 138.
233. Id. (footnotes omitted). But cf. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987) (Racial disparity
in a death penalty system is not enough to invalidate it.).
234. Note, Discrimination, supra note 9, at 358.
1050
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES
iii. Preserving social order: The problem of symbolism also directly
implicates the state's ability to preserve social order. For example, in
1979, amid racial tension, four white Miami police officers used flash-
lights and billy clubs to beat a young black man, Arthur McDuffie, to
death. 235 McDuffie was an insurance executive who had been stopped
for running a red light on his motorcycle. The four officers were tried for
manslaughter.236 At trial, the defendants used their peremptory chal-
lenges collectively to remove all African-Americans from the jury. When
the resulting all-white jury acquitted the defendants, the Miami black
community rioted again. Fourteen people were killed and the National
Guard was called out.237
The Supreme Court has emphasized several times that it is impor-
tant for the criminal justice system to work effectively in enforcing the
criminal laws, protecting the community, and preserving order. In Ohio
v. Roberts,z38 for example, Justice Blackmun wrote that "every jurisdic-
tion has a strong interest in effective law enforcement. 2 39 Criminal tri-
als play an important role in this process by serving a crime control
function,24 legitimating the state's exercise of coercive power over its
citizens, 24 ' and providing a general deterrent to crime.242
The state's interest in preserving order appears to be the equal of
almost any personal constitutional right the defendant can assert.2 43 For
example, in Lockhart v. McCree,24 the defendant's constitutional right
to an impartial jury was held to be less important than "the State's
235. See 4 Policemen Suspended in Death, N.Y. Times, Dec. 28, 1979, at A14, col. 5; Four
Miami Police Officers Charged in Fatal Beating, N.Y. Times, Dec. 29, 1979, at A12, col. 4.
236. See supra note 235.
237. See 2 Die as Blacks in Miami Protest Police Acquittals, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1980, at A24,
col. 1; 14 Die in Miami Riot Arson and Looting Persist for 2d Day, N.Y. Times, May 19, 1980, at A1,
col. 6.
238. 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
239. Id. at 64.
240. See Belsky, The Retaliation Doctrine: Promoting Forensic Misconduct, 50 ALB. L. REv.
763, 772 (1986); Packer, supra note 140, at 9-13.
241. See Arenella, supra note 211, at 200-08.
242. See id. at 197-99; Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the Acceptabil-
ity of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1360 (1985).
243. The state's interests in law enforcement have not, thus far, overridden the constitutional
exclusionary rules. That may be, however, because the exclusionary rule is based not only on the
individual defendant's interests but also on society's interest in limiting police powers and reducing
the negative symbolism of the government's profiting from its own illegal acts. Nevertheless, even
these exclusionary rules are under attack. See, eg., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08
(1984) (excluding incriminating evidence generates disrespect for law and order).
244. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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entirely proper interest in obtaining a single jury" to administer its con-
stitutional capital sentencing scheme.24 5 In United States v. Valenzuela-
Bernal,24 6 the defendant's constitutional right to call witnesses gave way
to the government's duties of enforcing the criminal laws and executing
immigration laws.247 In a number of other cases, the Court has empha-
sized that defendants' rights can be outweighed by competing societal
interests. z48
Excluding a minority group from participating in criminal trials
threatens the legitimacy of verdicts in the eyes of the community, reduces
the minority group's respect for law, and makes the preservation of order
more difficult. The law is supposed to eliminate racism, not institutional-
ize it. Several commentators have suggested, therefore, that the commu-
nity's interest in being protected from crime is best served when trial
verdicts are returned by juries on which all members of society are eligi-
ble to serve.249
iv. Efficiency: The Supreme Court has also expressed concern that
the trial system be operated reasonably efficiently. Because trial
resources are limited and many litigants want access to them, trial
resources must be allocated efficiently.25 0 Examples are legion. In Mor-
ris v. Slappy,251 a defendant complained that he had been denied effective
representation by being forced to go to trial only a few days after defense
counsel had been appointed. The Court approved the trial judge's deci-
sion, in part because of the difficulty of reassembling the witnesses,
jurors, and attorneys at a different time, and the burden of repeated court
245. Id. at 180; see also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44, 49, 51 (1980) (holding that the state
has a legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who are willing to vote for the death penalty and to
administer a constitutionally valid death penalty scheme).
246. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
247. Id. at 863, 872-73; see also United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 374 (1980) (government
has a legitimate interest in enforcing its criminal statutes).
248. See United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 164, 175 (1982) (society's interest in finality);
Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-28 (1982) (society's interest in finality and punishing offenders);
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50-51 (1980) (society's right to every person's evidence,
public interest in effective law enforcement).
249. See Gobert, supra note 193, at 288 (A racially neutral trial is more legitimate to both
defendant and community.); Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use, supra note 9, at 64 (prohibiting
racist peremptory challenges damages the legitimacy of the jury's verdict in the eyes of defendant,
but improves it for the community).
250. See Arenella, supra note 211, at 199-200; see also Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986
DUKE L.J. 747, 750-64 (Maintenance of a hierarchical system among judges in which discretion is
granted promotes efficient operation of the court system.). But see Gross, The American Advantage:
The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 740, 748-56 (1987) (Inefficient trials are
preferable because they would be more accurate and would deter needless litigation.).
251. 461 U.S. 1 (1983).
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appearances.252 In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal,2 53 the Court justi-
fied the deportation of material witnesses because of "several practical
considerations," noting the "financial and physical burdens" that would
be imposed on the government if it was required to detain all material
witnesses.254 In Wainwright v. Witt,2"' the Court declined to require the
judge to make an on-the-record finding of bias before excusing a juror,
expressing concern about the already heavy workload of trial courts. 256
In Lockhart v. McCree,257 the Court noted that states have an important
interest in using unitary juries in capital cases, despite the fact that such
juries are conviction-prone, because of the inefficiency of having to pres-
ent evidence twice if two juries were used.258 Additionally, the Court's
recent emphasis on finality and restricting "inefficient" appeals is well
known.259
In one sense, efficiency concerns support the argument against
imposing Batson-like restrictions on defendants. A rule requiring
defendants to justify their challenges would cause longer trials and
impose increased costs.26 Time would be spent explaining reasons for
peremptory challenges, and additional voir dire would be necessary so
that the attorney could find non-racial justifications.261 However, if effi-
ciency becomes a serious consideration, time may be saved by eliminating
peremptory challenges altogether 62 or by reducing the number of chal-
lenges to which each side is entitled.
d. The social value of chilling attorney-client conspiracies to engage
in racist jury selection: Extending Batson to defendants would not actu-
ally prohibit racially motivated jury selection. It would require the party
252. Id. at 11, 14-15; see also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507 (1983) (importance of
prompt administration of justice).
253. 458 U.S. 858 (1982).
254. Id. at 865-66.
255. 469 U.S. 412 (1985).
256. Id. at 430.
257. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
258. Id. at 180-84.
259. See, e.g., Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 126-29, 134 (1982) (limiting collateral attack based
on trial procedural errors because of their "costs," the principle of finality, and the specter of endless
post-conviction collateral attacks); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163-66 (1982) (similar); see
also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 234-35 n.1 (1980) (The Court will not hear a claim raised by
the state that was not presented to the court below because of considerations of judicial efficiency.).
260. See Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use, supra note 9, at 64-65.
261. See Pizzi, supra note 11, at 140.
262. See id. at 145.
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to come up with a nonracial justification for an apparently racist chal-
lenge.2 63 Forcing the defense attorney to articulate logical reasons for
peremptory challenges will not harm the attorney-client relationship. To
the contrary, it probably will have apositive effect on the quality of repre-
sentation the client receives. Although stereotypes have been shown to
be poor predictors of how jurors will vote,2 4 many attorneys neverthe-
less rely on them.265 If attorneys are required to look past the stereo-
types for more logical reasons on which to base peremptory challenges,
they may become more effective advocates.266
Professor Goldwasser, however, argues that in order to explain a
challenge, an attorney might have to reveal confidential information or
trial strategy, thereby creating tension between attorney and client and
casting a chilling effect on the relationship.2 67 The issue is whether this
should be a significant concern.
Arguments that rules of trial procedure will chill the exercise of
defendants' important trial rights have been made before, but have not
been particularly successful. The Supreme Court rejected a similar com-
plaint in Nix v. Whiteside.26 s In that case, the Court held that a defense
attorney who threatened to reveal his client's intent to commit perjury
did not infringe the client's right to counsel. The Justices concluded that
a defense attorney was ethically required to disclose anticipated perjury,
notwithstanding that such a rule might have a chilling effect on full and
263. See Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 688-89 (N.D. I11. 1988), mandamus
granted, order vacated, Maloney v. Plunkett, 854 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1988). In Maloney, the court
declared a mistrial in a reverse discrimination suit in which plaintiff challenged blacks and defendant
challenged whites. After the judge announced that he would apply Batson in the second trial, the
plaintiff again challenged whites and the defense again challenged blacks, but this time both sides
were able to state plausibly nonracial reasons for the challenges.
264. See, e-g., Sannito & Arnolds, Jury Study Results: The Factors at Work, TRIAL DIPL. J.,
Spring 1982, at 6, 9-10 (finding little correlation between race and verdict).
265. See 1 F. LANE, GOLDSTMIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE §§ 9.45-.48 (3d ed. 1984); Babcock, supra
note 139, at 553.
266. See Zeisel & Diamond, supra note 29, at 516-17 (finding that most attorneys do a poor job
of selecting jurors).
267. Goldwasser assumes that it is communication between attorney and client during jury
selection that would be chilled. Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 832. However, most attorneys do not
engage in any meaningful communication with their clients in voir dire. See Corboy, Structuring the
Presentation of Proof or Evidence, TRIAL DIPL. J., Summer 1978, at 20, 22-23 (No lawyer worth his
salt will ever allow a client to help select the jury.); cf. 1 F. LANE, supra note 265, § 9.81 (Consulting
with the client is good business practice for future relation with the client.). It is more likely that the
disclosure of reasons for challenges will reveal information learned from, and strategy based on,
pretrial discussion with the client. See Appleman, Selection of the Jury, 1968 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE
207, 220 (suggesting that attorneys give the appearance of consulting with their clients because it
looks good to the jury).
268. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
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frank communication between attorney and client.2 69 In Jenkins v.
Anderson27 and United States v. Havens,271 the Court approved of the
state's using otherwise unconstitutional evidence to impeach testifying
defendants. In both cases, the Court dismissed arguments that the rul-
ings would have chilling effects on defendants' participation in the trial.
As such, fears that extending Batson to defendants will improperly
chill the attorney-client relationship are misplaced. To the extent that
the rule would have any impact at all, it will facilitate legitimate profes-
sional relationships by compelling attorneys to do a better job of jury
selection. Moreover, the rule will benefit society by eliminating a highly
visible form of racism. The right to counsel is not meant to permit a
defendant to convert the attorney's office into a "den of thieves ' 2 72 where
conspiracies to deprive minority jurors of their civil rights are hatched.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK: THE COLLECTIVE
NEEDS OF THE COMMUNITY
Even if requiring defense attorneys to explain their peremptory chal-
lenges did have an adverse impact on defendants' right to counsel and
ability to present a defense, that would not answer the moral question in
this situation. Defendants' rights are not the only values at stake. Other
political values are implicated in a decision whether to restrict racist per-
emptory challenges. Most importantly, the community's desire to be free
of racism is at issue.
Over one hundred years ago, in Strauder v. West Virginia,273 the
Supreme Court condemned a racist system of jury selection as being a
pernicious "stimulant to that race prejudice which is an impediment to
...equal justice" in the community.27 4 In Swain v. Alabama,275 the
Court stated that denying blacks the same opportunities to participate in
the judicial system as whites harms minority members of the commu-
nity.276 Most recently, in Batson itself, the court stated that racist jury
269. Id. at 174-76.
270. 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (The prosecutor used defendant's prearrest silence to impeach trial
testimony that he had acted in self-defense.).
271. 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (Illegally seized and suppressed evidence was allowed to impeach testi-
fying defendant.).
272. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 52 (1980) (eliminating adverse spousal testimony
privilege).
273. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
274. Id. at 308.
275. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
276. Id. at 224.
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selection causes harm which extends beyond the individuals involved and
touches the entire community.277
Therefore, to state the case most favorably to the defendant, all that
can be said is that important social principles are in conflict. The defend-
ant has an individual right to present a defense to an impartial jury that
conflicts with the community's desire to be free from racism. If the issue
of limiting defense peremptory challenges were to come before the
Supreme Court in that posture, the Court would be faced with a stark
choice between individual and community needs.
It seems inappropriate and unnecessary to articulate some absolute
rule for resolving all such conflicts in the abstract. Undoubtedly, in some
situations the defendant's individual rights will be more important than
the community's conflicting desires. In other cases, however, the com-
munity's needs and interests should prevail. A blanket rule saying that
primary consideration must always be given to an individual's freedom
within society seems unwise.
Thus, the ultimate question in the Howard Beach case is whether
the defendants' right to unfettered exercise of peremptory challenges is
more important than the community's desire to be free from racism.
Freedom from racism is certainly among the highest priorities of society,
especially in the context of the court system. Trials can hardly be
expected to fulfill their role in the protection of society if they are per-
ceived as a white racist institution.278 Racial classifications generally are
given the strictest scrutiny by the courts,2 79 and attempts to inject racism
into trials are considered among the most serious threats to the trial's
fairness.280
By comparison, the defendant's desire to use peremptory challenges
under these circumstances is not very significant. A defendant who chal-
lenges prospective jurors based on stereotypes is not likely to be effective
in identifying and eliminating the antagonistic ones. That means racist
use of peremptory challenges are of little benefit in obtaining a fair trial.
Defendants are thus left with two possible reasons for wishing to exercise
peremptory challenges in this manner. The first is that the defendant is
277. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 87 (1986).
278. See Serr & Maney, Racism, Peremptory Challenges, and the Democratic Jury: The Juris-
prudence of a Delicate Balance, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 7-9 (1988).
279. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986); McLaughlin v. Florida,
379 U.S. 184, 191-93 (1964); cf. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 166 (1987) (A lesser stan-
dard of scrutiny might be appropriate in reverse discrimination cases.).
280. See Tanford, supra note 32, at 685-86 (Appeals to prejudice are the most serious violation
of rules governing proper closing argument.).
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willing to sacrifice the opportunity to improve the jury's composition in
order to give effect to personal racist feelings. When the desire of an
individual to discriminate conflicts with the community's desire to be
free from racism, the superiority of the community's desire is obvious.2"'
The second possibility is that the defendant believes that by remov-
ing African-American jurors, a white jury can be obtained that will
acquit the defendant for a racially motivated crime, despite the fact that
the defendant is guilty. For example, the Howard Beach defendants
might believe that a white jury will share their resentment against blacks
moving into the neighborhood and acquit them even if the evidence
proves their guilt. The right to conduct a defense, guaranteed by the
sixth amendment and by fundamental notions of fairness, should not be
stretched this far. The gap between factual guilt and legal guilt is already
wide. The Court has said that when defendants are acquitted because of
difficulties in obtaining and presenting proof under the rules of evidence,
it generates "disrespect for the law and the administration of justice." '282
To sanction the use of racial antagonism to obtain acquittals despite
provable guilt is, on moral grounds, even less justifiable.
IV. STEPS TOWARD PREVENTING RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION BY DEFENDANTS
The argument has now come full circle. We must consider again
whether this has been merely an intellectual exercise, or whether the
issue has practical significance. Because of the case or controversy
requirement, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will ever be in a posi-
tion to review directly the exercise of peremptory challenges by defend-
ants. That does not mean, however, that no legal actor has the
opportunity to take steps to prevent peremptory challenges from being
used in a racially discriminatory manner. Rules prohibiting discrimina-
tory jury selection by all parties can be enacted by legislatures or created
by courts.
Peremptory challenges are creatures of statute and may be regulated
by legislation. Although there has been some debate over whether the
281. I make no claim that the reverse would be true. Just as there is no justification for a
blanket rule that individual freedom is always more important than community desires, neither is it
sensible to say that the community's desires will always justify restricting individual freedom.
Therefore, if a white person wanted to sell property to a black person, but the community desired
that racial segregation be maintained, the community's desire should not necessarily prevail. See
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
282. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984) (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
491 (1976)).
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use of legislation is a good idea,283 or even a realistic possibility,284 no one
has suggested it is beyond the power of the legislature to regulate per-
emptory challenges. 285 The Supreme Court has stated several times that
the matter of peremptory challenges is entirely under legislative con-
trol.286 Moreover, the matter should not simply be left to state legisla-
tures. Congress has the "power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of" the equal protection clause.28 7
Courts also have the power to take steps to prevent racial discrimi-
nation in jury selection. Courts have rule-making power and can propose
amendments to the Rules of Criminal Procedure. For example, Rule 24
could be amended to include a provision that tracks the language of
Batson:
The use of peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors
solely on account of their race is prohibited. Upon the complaint of
either the prosecutor or the defendant, the judge shall determine,
based on all available information, if a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination exists. Normally a showing that the prosecution is exercis-
ing all or most of its challenges against members of the defendant's
racial group, or that the defense is exercising all or most of its chal-
lenges against members of a racial group other than the defendant's,
will be sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. A
peremptory challenge will then be allowed only if the party exercising
it can articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to
be tried.
Even without a formal rule, individual courts could follow Justice
Demakos' example and use their inherent supervisory powers to prevent
racially discriminatory jury selection.288
283. Compare Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 11, at 376-77 (legislative response is too inflexi-
ble) with Note, Defendant's Discriminatory Use, supra note 9, at 60 (legislative solution desirable).
See also Pizzi, supra note 11, at 148-49 (The legislature is the appropriate body to balance the need
for inquiry into reasons for peremptory challenges and efficiency concerns, and could reduce the
number of peremptory challenges to two or three.).
284. Pizzi, supra note 11, at 150-51 (arguing that legislative reform is unlikely, citing recent
attempts by states to modify voir dire practices that were defeated through intense lobbying by trial
bar).
285. See Goldwasser, supra note 9, at 820 (conceding that the matter could be regulated by
statute).
286. Eg., Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887) (positing that legislatures have full disclo-
sure to determine the appropriate number of peremptory challenges).
287. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
288. See Maloney v. Washington, 690 F. Supp. 687, 688-89 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (ordering civil
parties in reverse discrimination lawsuit not to base their peremptory challenges on the race of pro-
spective jurors); Clark v. City of Bridgeport, 645 F. Supp. 890, 894 (D. Conn. 1986) (similar); Holley
v. J & S Sweeping Co., 143 Cal. App. 3d 588, 592, 192 Cal. Rptr. 74, 77 (1983) (similar).
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The enactment of an explicit rule would be desirable for four rea-
sons. First, it is more practical to enact such a rule to reduce racism in
criminal trials than to wait for the Supreme Court to hear a class action
suit brought by the community.289 Second, the rule can be enforced
against a defendant, and the defendant can appeal, thus creating a feasi-
ble way for the issue to reach the Supreme Court. Third, a formal rule
would foster more uniform practice within a jurisdiction than leaving the
matter up to individual judges,2 9° thereby reducing rather than aggravat-
ing the appearance of arbitrariness in the judicial system. Last, changing
a traditional trial procedure by announcing a rule in advance is prefera-
ble to changing it by an ex post facto rule imposed by an appellate
court.29 1
V. CONCLUSION
Both formal and normative analyses of a defendant's racist use of
peremptory challenges lead to the conclusion that the courts and legisla-
tures can and should take steps to eliminate the practice. Neither limita-
tions on the reach of the equal protection clause, nor the defendant's
fundamental right to present a defense, presents barriers to pursuing this
important social policy.
Formal analysis suggests that defense peremptory challenges can be
limited. They are not of constitutional dimension, but rather are created
by statute. Therefore, such challenges can be regulated by statute in pur-
suit of important social objectives. Arguments that the defendant's trial
conduct is beyond the reach of the equal protection clause are beside the
point. Imposing limitations on a defendant's racist conduct will restore
equal application of law and further the objective of the fourteenth
amendment.
Normative analysis of the problem leads to the conclusion that
racist defense peremptory challenges should be prohibited. Racism in
jury selection harms the removed jurors and the community, while
aggravating the social and political alienation of racial minorities. Of
289. Cf. Carter v. Jury Comm'n, 396 U.S. 320 (1970) (Class action suit challenging jury system
was racially discriminatory.).
290. Two cases from the same judicial district reached opposite conclusions within three
months. Compare Clark 645 F. Supp. 890 (limiting civil parties' peremptory challenges) with Espo-
sito v. Buonome, 642 F. Supp. 760, 761 (D. Conn. 1986) (declining to limit civil parties' peremptory
challenges).
291. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 44 (1978) (criticizing legal positivism
because it requires trial judges to "legislate" new rules when they make decisions in areas not cov-
ered by existing rules, and then apply this new rule to the parties, which is an ex post facto law).
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course, these communitarian interests conflict with the defendant's indi-
vidual right to present a defense, so the Court must make a choice
between them."'2 While the importance of preserving individual liberties
may in many cases outweigh the desires of the community, the racist use
of peremptory challenges is not such a case. The defendant's wish to
engage in private discrimination advances no legitimate goal of litigation.
Further, such one-sided discrimination is inconsistent with the principle
of symmetry that pervades the adversary system and may frustrate the
desire to assure accurate verdicts. Additionally, it is bad symbolism to
reinforce the perception that the courts are a white racist institution. It
is delegitimating and thus frustrates the justice system's goal of preserv-
ing order. Therefore, if the Court must choose between the community's
desire to be free of racism and the defendant's right to engage in it, the
community's needs should prevail.
292. For arguments that "choice" is a more appropriate metaphor than the usual "balancing,"
see Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PiTr. L. REV. 1, 50-52 (1983); Tanford, Political-Choice,
supra note 212, at 859-71. See also Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.L 943, 978 (1987) (Balancing does not help answer questions about whose interests are entitled to
consideration.).
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